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ABSTRACT 
How would China fare in its first WTO case? That question has been of interest 
to international trade law practitioners and scholars ever since China acceded to 
the WTO on 11 December 2001, and indeed even before then, in the years 
leading up to its accession. The answer now exists. China lost, and lost rather 
thoroughly, in the 2009 Auto Parts case. However, its loss is a lesson to China, 
and indeed all WTO Members, about important GATT principles, and indeed 
about the Golden Rule. Further, for China, and the world, the Auto Parts 
litigation leads to broader and deeper questions about the nature and extent of 
economic and political reforms. 
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I. THE END OF THE HONEYMOON 
 
A. Overview 
 
 It was a fight over cars and car parts that marked the end of China’s honeymoon 
period at the World Trade Organization (WTO), those blissful few years when its 
major trading partners were willing to forgive its trespasses because this largest of 
developing countries had just joined the club. The United States was not alone in 
bringing the Auto Parts case against China, the first WTO litigation brought against 
China since it acceded to the WTO on 11 December 2005.1 (Previous Chinese 
                                                
1 The formal citation to the case is China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (complaints 
by European Communities, United States, and Canada), WT/DS/339/AB/R, WT/DS/340/R, and 
WT/DS/342/AB/R (adopted 12 January 2009). 
 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Japan, Mexico, Thailand, and (notably) Taiwan (Chinese Taipei) 
participated as third parties in all three Panel proceedings, and at the Appellate Body stage. Taiwan 
attended the oral hearing, and provided no written submission. There is no coverage in the Appellate 
Body report of what Taiwan thought about the case. Some of the third parties have major auto and 
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involvement was limited to a third party role). Canada and the European 
Communities (EC) also filed a claim against China. No longer was China a voluntary 
third-party participant. Now, it was compelled to defend its trade rules and policies 
before an independent international adjudicator. 
 
 More than history was at stake. Commercially, China is the third largest economy 
in the world (measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP)), after the United States 
and Japan, and besting Germany in 2007.2 After the United States, China boasts of 
the second largest consumer auto market in the world.3 Likewise, following America, 
China is the second largest producer of autos and auto parts in the world.4 Yet, in the 
two countries the fortunes of this strategic sector are headed in opposite directions. 
Car sales of new passenger vehicles in the United States (both total and retail) have 
trended downwards since 2000 (from just under 18 million to below 12 million 
vehicles per year between 2000 and 2009, respectively).5 Job loss and wage decline in 
the American auto industry are a decades-long phenomena. Conversely, the auto 
industry has been an engine of Chinese economic development. The market share of 
Chinese-owned vehicle producers (such as Chery) has risen relative to that of joint 
ventures between Chinese and foreign companies, and imported cars account for less 
                                                                                                                                
auto parts interests in respect of China, as exporters to China, foreign direct investors in China, or 
both. 
 At the request of all three complainants, the same Panel heard all three cases, and at the request 
of the United States, this Panel issued a single Report with slightly different conclusions and 
recommendations for each complainant. Also at the request of the Americans, the Appellate Body set 
out its conclusions and recommendations separately for each complainant (in Paragraphs 253-254), 
thus issuing three reports, although the main body (Paragraphs 1-252) is presented as a unity. See 
China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, infra, at ¶¶ 1 fn. 1, 9, 12; China Auto Parts Panel Report, infra, 
at ¶ 2.7. Canada, the European Communities, and the United States also participated as third parties 
in the actions brought by the other Members. Given the significant interests of all three in the Chinese 
auto market, their collaboration is not surprising. For example, car manufacturers from Europe 
account for 20-25 percent of all auto production in China. See China Probed Over Car Parts Tariffs, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, 27 October 2006, at 2. 
 Interestingly, the Appellate Body received an unsolicited amicus curiae brief, but (after giving the 
complainants, respondent, and third parties the chance to express their opinion) did not find it 
necessary to rely on it to decide the case. See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, infra, at ¶ 11. 
2 See Geoff Dyer, Chinese Data Put Economy in Third Place, FINANCIAL TIMES, 15 January 2009, at 1. 
Of course, some healthy skepticism is appropriate in respect of statistics put out by the Chinese 
Communist Party. See Geoff Dyer, Economists at Odds Over Reliability of Beijing Data, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
15 January 2009, at 3. 
3 See John Reed & Bernard Simon, The Thrill is Gone, FINANCIAL TIMES, 3 February 2009, at 9; 
Jonathan Lynn, UPDATE 2 – China Loses WTO Appeal in Car Parts Dispute, REUTERS, 15 December 
2008, available at www.reuters.com. See also Kathleen E. McLaughlin, China Poised to be 2nd Largest Car 
Market by End of 2006, Government Economist Says, 23 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1566 (2 
November 2006) (quoting Xu Changming, Senior Economist, State Information Center, State Council 
of China, stating “[t]he era of common household car ownership in China is drawing near”). 
4 See China Probed Over Car Parts Tariffs, FINANCIAL TIMES, 27 October 2006, at 2. 
5 See John Reed & Bernard Simon, The Thrill is Gone, FINANCIAL TIMES, 3 February 2009, at 9 
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than 5 percent of all auto sales in China.6 China aims to win 10 percent of the global 
car market by circa 2016.7 (A worrying sign for China is the effect of recession on its 
prized auto industry: in early 2009, the market for used cars was growing faster than 
for new cars, adding to protectionist pressures within the country.8) These 
commercial facts have their own political ramifications, i.e., the Auto Parts case is a 
historic dispute set in the broad context of the political economy and development 
of China. 
 
 This article explores China’s first loss at the WTO. Lose it did, at both the Panel 
and Appellate Body stage, on all the claims that mattered. The 25 percent charge 
China imposed on imported auto parts ran afoul of the Golden Rule of international 
trade law, national treatment. Part II sets out the facts of the case, and Part III 
provides essential information about the principles of international trade law that 
were at stake. Part IV examines the Panel rulings. Part V surveys the key issues on 
appeal, and holdings of the Appellate Body. Parts VI and VII analyze the arguments 
China made and lost on appeal. Part VIII offers three comments about the case. 
First, China can take heart from a small victory it achieved in the case, namely, in 
proving it did not violate the promises it made when acceding to the WTO. Second, 
the case is a useful tutorial for China about the Golden Rule of trade, which stems 
from Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)9. Third, 
and perhaps most importantly, the case plays only a small role in a much grander 
drama on stage in China concerning the grip on political power held by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). 
 
B. Part of a Larger Development Drama 
 
 More broadly, development is the underlying narrative in the story of China’s 
first defeat at the WTO. A common feature of developing countries (and, a fortiori, 
least developed countries) is their lack of legal capacity to participate fully and 
effectively in the international trade arena. As the world’s largest developing country, 
China is a land of pockets of garish wealth and stunning skylines amidst a desert of 
mild to extreme poverty and life-threatening pollution. Its legal capacity in 
international trade is a microcosm of this macrocosm. 
 
                                                
6 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Panel Upholds U.S., EU, Canada in Final Ruling in China Auto Parts Case, 
25 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 448-449 (27 March 2008) (reporting on 2006 data). 
7 See China Probed Over Car Parts Tariffs, FINANCIAL TIMES, 27 October 2006, at 2. 
8 See Patti Waldmeir & John Reed, China Used-Car Dealers in Top Gear, FINANCIAL TIMES, 5 
February 2009, at 6. 
9 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay 
round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) 
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 There exists a small, growing cadre of brilliant trade lawyers, typically educated 
outside China and now working in Beijing and Shanghai. The vast majority of 
lawyers, and worryingly, judges, have precious little appreciation for the policies, 
much less the intricacies, of the GATT–WTO regime. Thus, the Auto Parts dispute 
provides the first case study in the development of China’s legal capacity to bring 
and defend claims on the world stage. Why did China not settle the case, after it 
failed to give a convincing justification for its controversial measures?10 Why did it 
press on with an appeal, after the widely-reported preliminary and final panel rulings 
clearly condemned its controversial trade measures?11 How did China argue the case, 
given that it was aware of the strong claims against it since 2004?12 Why were China’s 
arguments largely unpersuasive? What legal lessons are there for China as it develops 
in the area of international trade adjudication? These and related issues will be asked 
and debated on for generations to come, and rightly so, if China aspires to develop 
its trade law capacity. Assuming China indeed has this aspiration, it might also be 
                                                
10 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Talks with China on Auto Parts Dispute Ends with No Sign of Resolution, 23 
International Trade Reporter (BNA) 762 (18 May 2006). The first WTO action brought against China 
was by the United States, which contended China taxed imported semi-conductors in a discriminatory 
fashion. China settled that action by agreeing to end the discriminatory treatment. See id. In the Auto 
Parts case, China’s cut on auto tariffs to 10 percent (from a range with a high point of 16.4 percent), 
and its cut on autos to 25 percent (from 28 percent) effective 1 July 2006, seemed a clumsy effort to 
solve the case that failed to address the underlying claims of discriminatory treatment, and in any 
event were necessary for China to fulfill its WTO accession commitments. See Kathleen E. 
McLaughlin & Christopher S. Rugaber, China to Reduce Import Tariffs on Autos, Some Parts Effective July 1, 
23 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 947 (22 June 2006); Daniel Pruzin & Christopher S. Rugaber, 
U.S., EU Initiate WTO Dispute Complaints Against Chinese Restrictions on Auto Parts, 23 International 
Trade Reporter (BNA) 530-531 (6 April 2006); China to Cut Car Import Duties, FINANCIAL TIMES, 16 
June 2006, at 5. 
 China also blocked the first request for the establishment of a panel in the Auto Parts case, did 
not accept the slate of panelists (requiring WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy to appoint them), and 
reacted angrily to the eventual formation of a panel, all signs, perhaps, which adduce a pugnacious 
approach, in contrast to the semi-conductor case. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S., EU, Canada Ask Lamy to 
Appoint Panel Members in China Auto Parts Case, 24 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 134 (25 January 
2007); Kathleen E. McLaughlin, China Ministry Complains About WTO Case on Auto Part Tariffs, Cites 
Shrinking Duties, 23 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1566-1567 (2 November 2006); Daniel 
Pruzin, U.S., EU, Canada to Renew Requests at WTO for Panels to Rule on China Car Parts Tariffs, 23 
International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1507 (19 October 2006); Daniel Pruzin, China Blocks U.S., EU, 
Canadian Requests for WTO Panel Review of Auto Parts Tariffs, 23 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 
1436-1437 (5 October 2006). 
11 See Frances Williams, WTO Panel Finds Against China in Import Tariff Dispute, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
19-20 July 2008, at 2; Rossella Brevetti, WTO Panel Issues Ruling Upholding U.S. Complaint on China Auto 
Part Import Duties, 25 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1100 (24 July 2008); Daniel Pruzin, WTO 
Panel Upholds U.S., EU, Canada in Final Ruling in China Auto Parts Case, 25 International Trade Reporter 
(BNA) 448-449 (27 March 2008); Daniel Pruzin, WTO Issues Preliminary Ruling Condemning China on 
Auto Parts Tariffs in U.S., EU Case, 25 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 270 (21 February 2008). 
12 Daniel Pruzin & Christopher S. Rugaber, U.S., EU Initiate WTO Dispute Complaints Against 
Chinese Restrictions on Auto Parts, 23 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 530-531 (6 April 2006) 
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asked why (despite the requests of the complainants) China refused to allow public 
access to the WTO proceedings?13 
 
Not surprisingly, The Economist summarized the wide context and repercussions 
of China’s first loss, not only for China, but also for foreign countries and their 
industries: 
 
 [O]n a symbolic and practical level, the case could be a 
turning-point for many industries in China: the start of a new era 
in which they are attacked by litigation. 
 … 
 The WTO decision also draws attention to China’s 
increasingly fractious trade relationships, which are the source of 
a growing number of anti-dumping actions…. Most importantly, 
it shows China’s potential vulnerability before the WTO. 
 … [T]he Chinese government has not just intervened on 
behalf of partsmakers. It has erected barriers to protect many 
other industries, for example by imposing elaborate registration 
and certification requirements for imported food, cosmetics, 
chemicals, and pharmaceuticals. These do not apply to local 
firms, which is just the kind of preferential treatment that could 
fall foul of WTO rules. 
 China was eager to join the WTO on the basis that 
membership of a large, multilateral organization would enhance 
its ability to compete with other big countries. But its odd, state-
dominated economy makes it particularly sensitive to verdicts of 
this kind.14 
 
A related matter is the role exports play in Chinese economic growth, which, in two 
words is “huge” and “unsustainable.” 
 
                                                
13 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Panel Chairman Sets Dates for Decision on China Auto Tariffs, 24 
International Trade Reporter (BNA) 308 (1 March 2007) (noting the contrast between the policy of 
the complainants to make WTO adjudication more transparent, hence their request to open the panel 
proceedings in the Auto Parts case, and the political sensitivity of China about its first case). 
 The transparency of China’s international trade law regime – like that of many developing 
countries – has been a long-standing concern of the United States and other developed countries. The 
ostensibly straightforward task of obtaining accurate information about Chinese laws – what they are 
and how they are applied – often proves not to be simple. See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, U.S. to Press China for 
Answers on Alleged Barriers to Goods Trade, 23 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1636-1637 (16 
November 2006) (reporting on the difficulty in obtaining data from China on barriers to trading rights 
of foreign firms, export quotas and export duties on coking coal (used to make steel), value added tax 
(VAT) rebates for steel, investment incentives for the purchase of domestic industrial machinery, and 
policies on SOEs). 
14 Inevitable Collision, THE ECONOMIST, 23 February 2008, at 82-83 (commenting on the impact of 
the Panel decision). 
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 As even China’s Premier, Wen Jiabao, has admitted, it is “unstable, unbalanced, 
uncoordinated, and unsustainable” for China to continue to rely on exports, rather 
than domestic consumption, as the dominant component of its growth in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).15 In the United States, personal consumption was 67 
percent of GDP for the last quarter of the 20th century, and 72 percent between 2000 
and 2008. In China, domestic consumption has fallen from 45 percent of GDP in 
the mid-1990s to 35 percent of GDP in 2009. China must increase its wage levels, so 
that its citizens have more disposable income to spend. (Wages in China account for 
40 percent of GDP, whereas in the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialised nations the 
comparable figure is 52 percent.) But, how can China boost wage levels without 
damaging its international competitive advantage by driving up its own labor costs? 
Even if wage levels rise, why would average Chinese citizens spend on consumer 
items when they must save for their and their children’s education and health care, 
and for their pensions, as the state no longer provides a comprehensive safety net? 
Amidst these challenges, how can China continue to privatize state owned 
enterprises (SOEs), end export subsidies, allow its currency to float freely in foreign 
exchange markets, and open major sectors – like autos and auto parts – to free trade? 
 
 The historic Auto Parts case is a multi-layered story in an environment of colossal 
challenges for China and the world. The case is about the development of legal 
capacity in the one developing country about which every other country cares. It is 
about a sector on which the fortunes of tens of millions of Chinese and foreigners 
ride. It is about the structure of the Chinese economy and the role the CCP plays in 
directing domestic and foreign factors of production. The Auto Parts case may even 
be about – in a tiny way – the beginning of the end of the six decades of political 
dominance by the CCP. 
 
II. THE ADVERSE MEASURES16 
 
 Underlying the actions brought against China by the United States, Canada, and 
EC was the same factual predicate. China imposed measures that adversely affected 
                                                
15 Quoted in David Pilling, China Should Raise Wages to Stimulate Demand, FINANCIAL TIMES, 5 
February 2009, at 9. The statistics in this paragraph are taken from this source. 
16 This discussion is drawn from Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Imports of 
Automobile Parts (complaints by EC, US, Canada), WT/DS/339/AB/R, WT/DS/340/R, and 
WT/DS/342/AB/R (adopted 12 January 2009) ¶¶ 1-13, 109-126 (hereinafter, China Auto Parts 
Appellate Body Report); Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (complaints 
by EC, US, Canada), WT/DS/339/AB/R, WT/DS/340/R, and WT/DS/342/AB/R ¶¶ 1.1-2.7 
(adopted as modified by the Appellate Body 12 January 2009) (hereinafter, China Auto Parts Panel); 
World Trade Organization, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV/33 (3 June 2008), at 
54-56. 
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exports of automobile parts into the Chinese market.17 In controversy were three 
legal instruments issued by the CCP government: 
 
1. Policy Order 8 – 
 Policy on Development of the Automotive Industry, Order Number 8 of the 
National Development and Reform Commission, effective 21 May 
2004. 
 
2. Decree 125 – 
 Administrative Rules on Importation of Automobile Parts Characterized as 
Complete Vehicles, Decree Number 125 of the People’s Republic of 
China, effective 1 April 2005. 
 
3. Announcement 4 – 
 Rules on Verification of Imported Automobile Parts Characterized as Complete 
Vehicles, Public Announcement Number 4 of 2005 of the Customs 
General Administration of the People’s Republic of China, effective 
1 April 2005. 
 
Policy Order 8 establishes the legal basis for Decree 125 and Announcement 4. 
Under that Order, the Customs General Administration (CGA) works with other 
relevant Chinese governmental departments (such as the Ministries of Commerce 
and Finance, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and the 
Verification Centre) to promulgate specific rules about the imports of autos and auto 
                                                
17 Among the Chinese auto component makers are Weichai Power Co. Ltd. and Changchun 
FAW – Sihuan Automobile Co. Ltd. Some American component makers, like Delphi Corp. and 
Visteon Corp., also produce parts in China. Insofar as car manufacturers import some components, 
rather than purchase from domestic suppliers, these firms are among the ones potentially affected by 
the Appellate Body decision discussed herein. See Jonathan Lynn, UPDATE 2 – China Loses WTO 
Appeal in Car Parts Dispute, REUTERS, 15 December 2008, available at: www.reuters.com. Without 
doubt, exporters of autos and auto parts in the complainant countries are affected, and their 
representatives at the meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) urged China to 
implement the Appellate Body decision as quickly as possible given the “current perilous state of the 
automobile industry.” Daniel Pruzin, Citing Carmaker’s Woes, U.S., EU Urge China to Implement Quickly 
WTO Auto Parts Ruling, 26 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 77 (15 January 2009). 
 To be sure, several foreign car manufacturers (e.g., Honda, General Motors, Toyota, and 
Volkswagen AG) are wont to rely on components produced in China (and they account for 80 
percent or more of the value of the models the foreign firms build in China), because the local parts 
are cheaper than imports (and the quality of local parts has improved), notwithstanding the added 
tariff cost associated with imports. In other words, these companies do not all complain about high 
Chinese tariffs, which leads to the inference that the Auto Parts dispute is perhaps more political than 
economic in nature. See UPDATE 1 – China Commerce Ministry Regrets WTO Car Parts Ruling, REUTERS, 
16 December 2008, available at: www.reuters.com; Richard McGregor & Geoff Dyer, Trade Friction Puts 
Heat on China, FINANCIAL TIMES, 1-2 April 2006, at 4. 
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parts. Decree 125 implemented those rules. Essentially, the rules deal with the 
supervision and administration of parts that are imported and subsequently 
assembled into certain models of cars. The rules also set the criteria to characterize 
whether imported auto parts should be treated as a complete vehicle. Announcement 
4 gives further details on the procedures and criteria set out in Order 8. 
 
 Taken together, the measures may be referred to as “China’s 2004 Automobile 
Policy.”18 Briefly stated, the Policy imposes a 25 percent charge on imported auto 
parts used in the manufacture or assembly of certain models of motor vehicles in 
China, and sold in the Chinese domestic market. But, the imposition occurs only if 
those imported parts are characterized as – or, stated differently, if they have the 
essential character of – a completed vehicle based on criteria prescribed in the 
Policy.19 Further, the charge is levied only after the parts are imported and assembled 
in China into a finished vehicle. The criteria are a set of thresholds concerning the 
type or value of imported auto parts used to produce specific models of vehicles. 
More precisely, as the Appellate Body explained: 
 
The measures set out … the criteria that determine when 
imported parts used in a particular vehicle model must be 
deemed to have the “essential character” of complete vehicles 
and are thus subject to the 25 per cent charge. These criteria are 
expressed in terms of particular combinations or configurations 
of imported auto parts or the value of imported parts used in the 
production of a particular vehicle model. The use in the 
production of a vehicle model of specified combinations of 
“major parts” or “assemblies” that are imported requires 
characterization of all parts imported for use in that vehicle 
model as complete vehicles. [Note that the noun “assembly” as a 
synonym for “major part” should not be confused with the verb 
“assemble” in the sense of putting together parts to make a 
finished car.] Various combinations of assemblies will meet the 
criteria, for example:  a vehicle body (including cabin) assembly 
and an engine assembly; or five or more assemblies other than 
the vehicle body (including cabin) and engine assemblies. The 
use, in a specific vehicle model, of imported parts with a total 
price that accounts for at least 60 per cent of the total price of 
the complete vehicle also requires characterization of all 
imported parts for use in that vehicle model as complete 
vehicles. Imports of CKD and SKD kits [completely-knocked 
                                                
18 See Amy Tsui, WTO Affirms Chinese Measures, Treatment of Imports of Auto Parts Violate Obligations, 
25 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1779 (18 December 2008). 
19 Both the Panel and Appellate Body intentionally used the term “charge,” rather than “duty” or 
“tariff.” China’s 2004 Automobile Policy employs the latter two terms, but the Panel and Appellate 
Body preferred the word “charge” because it was neutral as to whether the “charge” fell under Article 
II or Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). See China Auto Parts 
Appellate Body Report, ¶ 109 fn. 127. 
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down vehicle kits and semi-knocked down vehicle kits, 
respectively, discussed below] are also characterized as complete 
vehicles.20 
 
Broadly speaking, this passage reveals two thresholds that will lead to 
characterization of imported auto parts as a completed vehicle: 
 
1. Volume threshold – 
 Employing certain key imported major parts (i.e., assemblies), or a 
designated combination of imported major parts, to make a vehicle, 
which effectively summed to 60 percent or more of the content of 
the vehicle.21 
 
2. Value threshold – 
                                                
20 China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 114 (citations omitted, emphasis in original). In a 
footnote, the Appellate Body explained the term “assembly” under Decree 125 included “the vehicle 
body (including cabin) assembly, the engine assembly, the transmission assembly, the driving axle 
assembly, the driven axle assembly, the frame assembly, the steering system, and the braking system.” 
As indicated, the term corresponds loosely to the major parts of a vehicle. In a separate footnote, the 
Appellate Body summarized Decree 125 as containing 
 
[t]he following combinations of “assemblies” …:  (i) imports of 
a vehicle body (including cabin) assembly and an engine 
assembly for the purpose of assembling vehicles; (ii) imports of a 
vehicle body (including cabin) assembly or an engine assembly, 
plus at least three other assemblies, for the purpose of 
assembling vehicles; and (iii) imports of at least five assemblies 
other than the body (including cabin) and engine assemblies for 
the purpose of assembling vehicles. … In turn, the 
determination of whether auto parts used to produce an 
assembly will be deemed an “imported assembly” and therefore 
count towards the thresholds … is made based on criteria 
specified in … Decree 125. These criteria include: (i) a complete 
set of parts imported to assemble the assembly; (ii) “key parts” 
or “sub-assemblies” that reach or exceed specified quantities 
referred to in Annexes 1 and 2 to Decree 125; and (iii) the total 
price of the imported parts accounts for at least 60 per cent of 
the total price of that assembly. 
 
China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 114 fn. 147. 
21 See Daniel Pruzin & Christopher S. Rugaber, U.S., EU Initiate WTO Dispute Complaints Against 
Chinese Restrictions on Auto Parts, 23 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 530-531 (6 April 2006). This 
account states the volume threshold as in excess of 60 percent. 
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 Employing imported parts in a vehicle that account for 60 percent or 
more of the total price of that vehicle.22 
 
If the imported parts used in a particular vehicle meet or exceed the relevant 
threshold, then all of the imported parts used to assemble that model of vehicle are 
characterized as complete vehicles. As the Appellate Body explained: 
 
When the imported parts used in the production of a specific 
vehicle model meet the criteria under the measures at issue, then 
the 25 per cent charge and the requirements under the measures 
apply in respect of all imported parts assembled into the relevant 
vehicle model. [That is, the charge affects every imported part 
assembled into a completed vehicle, even a part that was not 
considered when determining whether the vehicle model in 
question met the volume or value threshold.] It is immaterial 
whether the auto parts that are “characterized as complete 
vehicles” were imported in multiple shipments – that is at 
various times, in various shipments, from various suppliers 
and/or from various countries – or in a single shipment. It is 
also immaterial whether the automobile manufacturer imported 
the parts itself or obtained the imported parts in the domestic 
market through a third party supplier such as an auto part 
manufacturer or other auto part supplier. However, if the 
automobile manufacturer purchases imported parts from such 
an independent third party supplier, the automobile 
manufacturer may deduct from the 25 per cent charge that is due 
the value of any customs duties that the third party supplier paid 
on the importation of those parts, provided that the automobile 
manufacturer can furnish proof of the payment of such import 
duties. If optional parts that are imported are installed on a 
relevant vehicle model, the manufacturer must report those 
optional parts to the Verification Centre, make declarations at 
the time of the actual installation of the optional parts and pay 
the 25 per cent charge on such optional parts.23 
 
In effect, China rolls up all imported parts together, and presumes, irrebutably, the 
imported parts impart the essential character of a completed vehicle. In turn, all 
imported parts used for the vehicle model are subject to the 25 percent charge. 
China imposes the charge following the assembly of the vehicles. 
 
 The 25 percent figure is no accident. It equals the average applied and bound 
tariff rate China lists as in its Schedule of Concessions as applicable to complete 
                                                
22 The value threshold, originally scheduled to take effect on 1 July 2006, entered into force on 1 
July 2008, because of the administrative complexity in implementing it. See China Auto Parts, Appellate 
Body Report, ¶ 195 fn. 275. 
23 China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 121 (citations omitted, emphasis in original). 
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motor vehicles.24 The 25 percent most-favoured nation (MFN) duty rate is higher 
than the average rate China applies to auto parts, and has bound, which is 10 
percent. As for imported auto parts that China does not characterize as complete 
vehicles, they are subject to the duty rate in China’s Schedule for parts, i.e., an 
average of 10 percent. Manifestly, China’s 2004 Automobile Policy was an effort, 
inter alia, “to discourage foreign car makers from importing vehicles in large parts to 
circumvent the higher tariff.”25 
 
 In sum, under the 2004 Automobile Policy, imported automobile parts used for 
the production in China of a vehicle for sale in China are subject to a charge. That 
charge equals the tariff for a completed imported vehicle, namely, 25 percent, and 
the automobile manufacturer (not the importer) is legally liable for paying the 
charge.26 The charge is levied only if those parts are imported and used in the 
production and assembly of a vehicle in excess of certain thresholds.  The thresholds 
– which are based on the volume and value criteria laid out in the Policy – define 
whether imported parts used in a particular vehicle model have the essential 
character of, and thus qualify as, a completed vehicle. If the imported parts have the 
essential character of a completed vehicle, then China slaps a 25 percent tariff on 
those parts, and indeed all imported parts used to make that model of vehicle. 
 
 China also applies the 25 percent charge – i.e., the tariff for a complete vehicle – 
on a CKD and SKD kit.27 These kits are a sub-set of all the products covered by 
China’s 2004 Automobile Policy.28 Yet, its Policy does not provide any definition of a 
“CKD” or “SKD” kit. Filling this definitional void, the Panel stated it considered 
these kits to refer to all, or nearly all, of the auto parts necessary to assemble a 
complete vehicle, which must be packaged and shipped in a single shipment and, 
following importation, which must go through a process of assembly to become a 
                                                
24 This document is Schedule CLII – People’s Republic of China (Part I – Schedule of 
Concessions and Commitments on Goods), attached as Annex 8 to China’s Accession Protocol, 
WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.1. 
25 UPDATE 1 – China Commerce Ministry Regrets WTO Car Parts Ruling, REUTERS, 16 December 
2008, available at: www.reuters.com. See also Daniel Pruzin, China Outlines Defense in WTO Dispute Over 
Auto Parts Tariffs, 24 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 621 (3 May 2007) (summarizing China’s 
argument about the prevention of circumvention by treating dissembled auto parts that have the 
essential character of a car as a complete vehicle, and thereby subjecting the shipment to the 25 
percent vehicle tariff, not the 10 percent parts tariff). 
26 If a manufacturer buys imported parts from an independent supplier, then the manufacturer 
may deduct from the 25 percent charge it owed the value of any customs duties the supplier paid on 
those parts, as long as the manufacturer has proof of such payment. See China Auto Parts Appellate 
Body Report, ¶ 174 fn. 235. 
27 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 4 fn. 19. 
28 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 210. 
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completed vehicle.29 The distinction between the two kits concerns assembly. A 
CKD kit contains auto parts imported together in an unassembled state. 
Subsequently, the parts are assembled to make a complete vehicle. An SKD kit also 
has auto parts imported together. But, some of the components in an SKD kit have 
been assembled prior to importation. 
 
 The auto parts subject to the 25 percent charge fall into four categories of the 
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (Harmonized System, or 
HS): 
                                                
29 The Appellate Body explained in further detail the procedural steps an automobile 
manufacturer must follow. In summary, before beginning production of a new vehicle model that will 
incorporate imported parts and be sold in the Chinese market, the manufacturer performs a self-
evaluation as to whether the imported parts to be used in that model have the essential character of a 
complete vehicle, and thus qualify as such and trigger the 25 percent charge. It submits the results to 
the NDRC and Ministry of Commerce. If the self-evaluation yields an affirmative result, then the 
manufacturer arranges for the Chinese government to list the vehicle model in question in a Public 
Bulletin. If the result is negative, then the Chinese government – specifically, the Verification Centre – 
conducts a verification examination to ensure the proposed vehicle model meets the thresholds 
established by the criteria in the 2004 Automobile Policy. If the Centre verifies the self-evaluation 
results, then the manufacturer is not subject to the 25 percent charge. 
 Once listed in the Public Bulletin, the manufacturer applies to the CGA to register the vehicle 
model. Assuming approval of the registration application, CGA requires the manufacturer to post a 
duty bond (a financial guarantee that final duties ultimately assessed will be paid) that corresponds to 
the 10 percent tariff rate on auto parts multiplied by the projected monthly importations of auto parts. 
At this point, the manufacturer may start importing parts for use in its new vehicle model. When the 
manufacturer imports the parts that are characterized as complete vehicles, it must specify on the 
relevant customs documentation that the parts are “characterized as complete vehicles.” Thereafter, 
the manufacturer is free to use the parts, though it must submit information (according to prescribed 
deadlines) to the CGA about all completed vehicles it made so that a “Verification Report” can be 
issued (by the Verification Centre). 
 Once that Report is issued, the relevant district customs office classifies the auto parts as 
complete vehicles, and assesses the 25 percent charge. The manufacturer makes a duty declaration on 
the tenth working day of each month for all complete vehicles of the relevant model that it assembled 
during the preceding month. The office collects the charge. 
 There are four principal qualifications to these procedures. First, an automobile manufacturer 
may apply for a re-verification of a vehicle model, if it changes the configuration or combination of 
imported parts it uses to manufacture that model, and it believes the change will affect the 
determination that the vehicle meets the essential character criteria. The Verification Centre is 
responsible for Re-Verification Reports. Second, if an automobile manufacturer does not use 
imported auto parts that it had declared as a complete vehicle, then it is eligible for the 10 percent 
auto parts duty rate. Third, if a Chinese auto or auto parts manufacturer substantially processes 
imported auto parts (other than an entire imported assembly or sub-assembly, i.e., it incorporates 
imported parts into an assembly or sub-assembly), then the imported parts are treated as a domestic 
parts, and not subject to the 25 percent charge. Fourth, an automobile manufacturer importing a 
CKD or SKD may declare and pay duties on the kits at the time of importation, and thereby obtain 
an exemption from certain aspects of the 2004 Automobile Policy that establish the 25 percent 
charge. See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report ¶¶ 114-126.  
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1. Complete motor vehicles (headings 87.02-87.04).30 
2. Certain intermediate categories of auto parts, specifically chassis 
fitted with engines (heading 87.06), and bodies for motor vehicles 
(heading 87.07). 
3. Other intermediate categories of auto parts, specifically parts and 
components of motor vehicles that fall under a particular HS heading 
(heading 87.08).31 
4. Parts and accessories of motor vehicles that fall under a variety of HS 
Chapters other than Chapter 87, such as engines (Chapter 84) 
(specifically, parts under headings 84.07-84.09, 84.83, 85.01, 85.03, 
85.06, 85.11-85.12, and 85.39). 
 
Thus, for example, suppose imported parts exceed the applicable volume or value 
threshold. Then, the Chinese government imposes, on all imported parts used in the 
relevant vehicle model, a charge amounting to 25 percent ad valorem, which is in 
addition to the normal MFN rate applicable to the parts. The Chinese government 
does not impose the same charge on domestically produced parts. Thus, the 2004 
Automobile Policy imposes different charges on vehicles made in China depending 
on the domestic content of the parts used in the production process. The Policy 
penalizes a manufacturer of vehicles in China for using imported auto parts in a 
vehicle destined for sale in China. Conversely, it gives producers an advantage if they 
use domestically made parts. 
 
III. RELEVANT GATT PRINCIPLES 
 
 As just explained, China bound its tariff on auto parts at MFN rates considerably 
lower than its tariff bindings for complete vehicles – 10 versus 25 percent. Yet, if an 
imported part is incorporated into a vehicle made and sold in China, and that vehicle 
contains imported parts in excess of a government-defined threshold, then the tariff 
imposed on the part is at the higher level, i.e., that of a finished vehicle. In effect, 
China bumped up the tariff on the imported part to the level of a finished good. 
Note, then, that China’s Schedule displays tariff escalation – the bound tariff rates 
are higher for complete motor vehicles than for components. The typical purpose of 
tariff escalation is to encourage the location of high value-added economic activity 
within the territory of the importing country. 
 
                                                
30 This category is the one to which the average applied Chinese tariff is 25 percent. There are 
variations at the HS 8 digit level, but the 25 percent figure is the average. 
31 This and the fourth categories are the ones for which China has an average applied tariff rate 
of 10 percent. 
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 Contrary to the tariff binding principles in GATT Article II:1, the bump up 
means China, assesses on the disfavoured imported auto parts, a charge that is in 
excess of the charges set forth and bound in its Schedule of Tariff Concessions for 
these imports. Article II:1 states:32 
 
1.         (a) Each contracting party shall accord to the 
commerce of the other contracting parties 
treatment no less favourable than that 
provided for in the appropriate Part of the 
appropriate Schedule annexed to this 
Agreement. 
 
(b)  The products described in Part I of the 
Schedule relating to any contracting party, 
which are the products of territories of other 
contracting parties, shall, on their importation 
into the territory to which the Schedule 
relates, and subject to the terms, conditions or 
qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be 
exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of 
those set forth and provided for therein.  
Such products shall also be exempt from all 
other duties or charges of any kind imposed 
on or in connection with the importation in 
excess of those imposed on the date of this 
Agreement or those directly and mandatorily 
required to be imposed thereafter by 
legislation in force in the importing territory 
on that date.33 
 
The extra charge also raises a problem under national treatment principles. 
 
 Those principles are set out in GATT Article III. The national treatment 
problems arise because the charge applies only to imports, not like domestic 
products. Article III:1-2 and 4 state: 
 
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and 
other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements 
affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal 
quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use 
of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be 
applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford 
                                                
32 Unless otherwise noted, all GATT and WTO rules are quoted from RAJ BHALA, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE – DOCUMENTS 
SUPPLEMENT (3d ed. 2008). 
33 Emphasis supplied. 
                                                            Trade, Law and Development                                                         [Vol. 1:1 16 
protection to domestic production.* 
 
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party 
imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall 
not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other 
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or 
indirectly, to like domestic products.  Moreover, no contracting 
party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges 
to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the 
principles set forth in paragraph 1.* 
 … 
 
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party 
imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be 
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, transportation, distribution or use.  The provisions of 
this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential 
internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on 
the economic operation of the means of transport and not on 
the nationality of the product.34 
 
Indicated by the asterisk (*) in Articles III:1-2, the Interpretative Note, Ad Article III 
(sometimes referred to as the Ad Note) provides: 
 
 Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, 
regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 
which applies to an imported product and to the like domestic 
product and is collected or enforced in the case of the imported 
product at the time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be 
regarded as an internal tax or other internal charge, or a law, 
regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1, 
and is accordingly subject to the provisions of Article III. 
 
Paragraph 1 
 
 The application of paragraph 1 to internal taxes imposed by 
local governments and authorities within the territory of a 
contracting party is subject to the provisions of the final 
paragraph of Article XXIV. The term “reasonable measures” in 
the last-mentioned paragraph would not require, for example, 
the repeal of existing national legislation authorizing local 
governments to impose internal taxes which, although 
technically inconsistent with the letter of Article III, are not in 
fact inconsistent with its spirit, if such repeal would result in a 
serious financial hardship for the local governments or 
authorities concerned.  With regard to taxation by local 
                                                
34 Emphasis supplied. 
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governments or authorities which is inconsistent with both the 
letter and spirit of Article III, the term “reasonable measures” 
would permit a contracting party to eliminate the inconsistent 
taxation gradually over a transition period, if abrupt action would 
create serious administrative and financial difficulties. 
 
Paragraph 2 
 
 A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence 
of paragraph 2 would be considered to be inconsistent with the 
provisions of the second sentence only in cases where 
competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed 
product and, on the other hand, a directly competitive or 
substitutable product which was not similarly taxed.35 
 
Further, the bump up is a way China discourages vehicle producers located in that 
country from using too many imported parts, and encourages them to source their 
inputs from suppliers in China. That is because China’s 2004 Automobile Policy 
specifies domestic content thresholds (using value or volume metrics). 
 
 This kind of encouragement is a prohibited subsidy, a Red Light import 
substitution subsidy, under Article 3:1(b) of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement)36. That is, the “subsidy” (under Article 1) is 
government revenue that China foregoes by imposing a lesser tariff on imported 
auto parts if a final, assembled vehicle contains the requisite level of local content. 
The subsidy is “specific” (under Article 2) to the auto industry. This specific subsidy 
is for import substitution under Article 3:1(b), which states: 
 
3.1. Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the 
following subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1, shall be 
prohibited: 
 
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact,37 
whether solely or as one of several other 
                                                
35 Emphasis supplied. 
36 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay 
round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 
37 A footnote to this phrase explains that de jure or de facto contingency exists: 
“when the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, 
without having been made legally contingent upon export 
performance, is in fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation 
or export earnings. The mere fact that a subsidy is granted to 
enterprises which export shall not for that reason alone be 
considered to be an export subsidy within the meaning of this 
provision.” 
                                                            Trade, Law and Development                                                         [Vol. 1:1 18 
conditions, upon export performance, 
including those illustrated in Annex I; 
 
(b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one 
of several other conditions, upon the use of 
domestic over imported goods.38 
 
Avoidance of the extra charges is contingent on the use of domestic over imported 
goods. That, in turn, helps keep Chinese factories in business and workers employed 
– all at the expense of Canadian, European, and American car parts companies and 
their work forces. 
 
 The 2004 Automobile Policy also biases the pattern of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) into China, raising concerns among the complainants that they ran afoul of the 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)39. The Policy confers an 
advantage on enterprises that use in the production of vehicles domestic rather than 
imported parts. This advantage may induce firms to establish parts manufacturing 
operations in China. By locating their plants in China, rather than exporting auto 
parts from outside China, they avoid imposition of the full vehicle duty rate on the 
parts. 
 
IV. LESSONS FROM THE PANEL40 
 
 In their separate actions before the Panel, the EC, Canada, and the United States 
made a large number of claims. Each complainant, averred China’s 2004 Automobile 
Policy, violated all or some of the following multilateral trade obligations – 
 
1. GATT Articles II:1(a)-(b) (concerning tariff bindings), III:1-2 and 
III:4 (concerning national treatment for fiscal and non-fiscal 
measures, respectively), III:5 (concerning domestic content 
requirements), and XI:1 (concerning quantitative restrictions).41 
 
2. Articles 2:1-2:2 of the WTO TRIMs Agreement (concerning national 
treatment and quantitative restrictions, and referring to GATT 
                                                
38 Emphasis supplied. 
39 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay 
round, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 
40 This discussion is drawn from China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report ¶¶ 1-13, 108-126; World 
Trade Organization, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV/33 (3 June 2008), at 54-56. 
41 These provisions are discussed in RAJ BHALA, MODERN GATT LAW chs. 4-6 (national 
treatment) and 11 (tariff bindings) (2005), as well as RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE chs. 12 (tariff bindings) and 13 (national treatment) (3d 
ed. 2008). 
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Articles III and XI), along with the related Illustrative List (in Annex 
1 thereto, particularly Paragraphs 1(a) and 2(a), concerning domestic 
sourcing and import substitution, and referencing GATT Articles 
III:4 and XI:1).42 
 
3. Articles 3:1(b) and 3:2 of the WTO SCM Agreement (concerning 
prohibited or “Red Light,” specifically import-substitution, 
subsidies).43 
 
4. Certain provisions in the WTO accession documents agreed to by 
China that lay out commitments China made to join the WTO, 
particularly Part I, Paragraphs 7.2-3 of the Protocol of Accession, and 
Paragraphs 93, 203 and 342 of the Working Party Report on the Accession 
of China (in conjunction with Part I, Paragraph 1.2 of the Accession 
Protocol).44 
 
The complaining WTO Members also asserted that the Automobile Policy nullified 
or impaired benefits accruing to them under the aforementioned agreements. 
 
 In the first decision by any WTO adjudicatory body against China, the Auto Parts 
Panel rendered a strong verdict against China’s Automobile Policy on the most 
potent arguments of the complainants. In particular:45 
 
1. National Treatment (Fiscal Measures) Violation – 
 
 The complainants alleged the 25 percent levy imposed under China’s 
2004 Automobile Policy was an “internal charge” incongruous with 
GATT Article III:2 (first sentence). China applied the internal charge 
to imported auto parts, but not to like domestic auto parts. That is, 
the internal charge China imposed on imported parts was in excess of 
that imposed on domestic parts. China’s response was that the 25 
percent levy was an ordinary customs duty (“OCD”) within the 
meaning of Article II:1(b) (first sentence), not an “internal charge” 
                                                
42 The TRIMs Agreement is treated in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE ch. 13, pt. II.C (3d ed. 2008).  
43 The SCM Agreement is treated in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE ch. 34 (3d ed. 2008). 
44 Canada pled an additional violation, namely, Article 2(b)-(d) of the WTO Agreement on Rules of 
Origin. See generally Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China’s WTO Accession Saga, 15 AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 1469-1538 (2000) (assessing China’s accession 
commitments based on the 15 November 1999 bilateral agreement between the United States and 
China). 
45 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶¶ 3-5, 7, 128-133, 183-184, 187. 
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subject to Article III:2 (first sentence). The Panel agreed with the 
complainants. 
 
2. National Treatment (Non-Fiscal Measures) Violation – 
 
 The complainants argued that by imposing the 25 percent levy, China 
violated GATT Article III:4, because it treated imported auto parts 
less favourably than like domestic auto parts. The less favourable 
treatment arose because China imposed additional administrative 
requirements, and additional charges, on automobile manufacturers 
that used imported auto parts in excess of thresholds specified in the 
2004 Automobile Policy. The result was a disincentive for producers 
to use imported parts. China’s response again was that the 25 percent 
levy was an OCD under Article II:1(b) (first sentence), not an internal 
measure governed by Article III:4. The Panel agreed with the 
complainants. 
 
3. Alternative Tariff Bindings Violation – 
 
 As an alternative contention, the complainants said China breached 
GATT Article II:1(a)-(b). The charge on imported auto parts 
imposed under China’s 2004 Automobile Policy – if considered an 
OCD – exceeded the bound tariff rates set out in China’s Schedule of 
Concessions. That Schedule is annexed to its Protocol of Accession, 
hence there was a violation of it and the Accession Working Party Report. 
China countered that the Policy did not run afoul of Article II, but 
rather gave effect to the proper interpretation of the term “motor 
vehicles” in its Schedule. As an alternative to its findings under 
Article III:1-2, the Panel held the Policy established an OCD within 
the scope of Article II:1(b) (first sentence). Under its Policy, China 
imposed duties in excess of the relevant tariff bindings in China’s 
Schedule, which were incongruous with Article II:1(a)-(b). 
 
4. Special Finding on Auto Kits – 
 
 On the assumption the 25 percent charge is characterized as an 
OCD, the complainants charged China violated GATT Article II:1(b) 
(first sentence) in its treatment of the CKD and SKD kits. The Panel 
disagreed, handing China its only substantive victory in the case. That 
is, the Panel said China legitimately could classify a CKD and SKD 
kit as a completed “motor vehicle” under its Schedule of 
Concessions, impose a 25 percent charge, and not breach its Article 
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II:1(b) (first sentence) tariff binding for finished cars.46 But, the Panel 
held Chinese treatment of these kits was inconsistent with Paragraph 
93 of China’s Accession Working Party Report. In that Paragraph, China 
pledged not to apply a tariff rate above 10 percent to imports of 
CKD and SKD kits. The Paragraph states: 
 
Certain members of the Working Party expressed particular 
concerns about tariff treatment in the auto sector. In response to 
questions about the tariff treatment for kits for motor vehicles, 
the representative of China confirmed that China had no tariff 
lines for completely knocked-down kits for motor vehicles or 
semi-knocked down kits for motor vehicles. If China created such 
tariff lines, the tariff rates would be no more than 10 per cent. The 
Working Party took note of this commitment.47 
 
 To reach its conclusion, the Panel held that by implementing the 
2004 Automobile Policy, China had created new tariff lines for CKD 
and SKD kits at the HS-10 digit level. 
 
5. Failure of the Administrative Necessity Defense – 
 
 The complainants urged that the violation of Article III:4, or in the 
alternative Article II:1(a)-(b), could not be excused under the 
administrative necessity exception of Article XX(d), which China had 
invoked. China invoked this exception because it said 2004 
Automobile Policy ensures “substance over form” in its 
administration of customs law. That is because the Policy allows 
Chinese customs officials to classify as a complete motor vehicle 
groups of auto parts that have the essential character of a complete 
vehicle, regardless of how an importer structures importation of the 
parts. In other words, the Policy prevents the circumvention of 
China’s tariff headings for complete motor vehicles. (This argument, 
of course, is about substantial completeness, a problem dealt with in 
United States customs law by the five-factor Daisy Heddon Test in 
United States customs law, and under World Customs Organization 
(WCO) standards by the General Rule of Interpretation (GRI) 2(a), 
known as the “Doctrine of the Entireties.”48 China’s point was that it 
                                                
46 This specific conclusion was not appealed. The application of GRI 2(a), discussed infra, to the 
term “motor vehicles” in China’s Schedule of Concessions, provided China with the legal basis for its 
classification of the kits. 
47 Quoted in China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 212 (emphasis supplied). 
48 See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE 
534, (3d ed. 2008). The Daisy-Heddon test was developed in Daisy-Heddon, Div. Victor Comptometer Corp. 
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properly applied GRI 2(a) by treating a dissembled set of parts that 
has the essential character of a car – i.e., is a substantially complete 
car – as a complete vehicle. Indeed, if it did not do so, said China, 
then importers would be able to circumvent its 25 percent MFN 
tariff on cars.) However, the Panel rejected China’s argument about 
tariff circumvention, partially because of the increasing 
standardization of auto parts, which means that many parts can be 
used interchangeably among different car models, allowing 
manufacturers to realize economies of scale by making families of 
vehicle models that share platforms and components, and for which 
60-70 percent of parts are common to the models. The Panel agreed 
China failed to prove that its violations of its GATT obligations 
satisfied the two-step test under the Article XX(d) exception. 
 
Still other major claims against China arose under GATT Articles III:5 and XI:1, 
Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement (including Paragraph 1(a) of Annex 1 thereto), and 
Article 3:1(b) and 3:2 of the SCM Agreement, Part I, Paragraphs 7:2-3 of China’s 
Accession Protocol and Paragraph 203 of its Accession Working Party Report. On all these 
claims, the Panel exercised judicial economy. 
 
V. LESSONS FROM THE APPELLATE BODY, IN BRIEF49 
 
A. Key Issues and Holdings 
 
 Not surprisingly, but perhaps not wisely, China appealed the verdicts of the 
Panel. Before the Appellate Body, the key issues were as follows:50 
 
1. Internal Charge or OCD? 
 
                                                                                                                                
v. United States, 600 F.2d 799 (CCPA 1979), and is summarized and applied in Simod America Corp. v. 
United States, 872 F. 2d 1572 (1989). See INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra, at 538-544. 
49 This discussion is drawn from China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report ¶¶ 1-13, 108-126, 253; 
World Trade Organization, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV/33 (3 June 2008), at 
54-56. 
50 China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 108. 
 Also at issue on appeal was whether the Panel violated Article 11 of the WTO Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding, or DSU) 
concerning its ruling about the United States and Canada mounting a prima facie case. The Appellate 
Body exercised judicial economy on this issue. See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 
108(d)(ii), 246. 
 At the Panel Stage, China unsuccessfully argued its 2004 Automobile Policy does not itself 
impose a duty or fee, but rather defines the circumstances under which China classifies imported parts 
under a different tariff provision. The Panel held the Policy does establish a charge, and China did not 
appeal the finding. 
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 Is the 25 percent charge an internal charge under GATT Article III:2 
(first sentence), rather than an OCD under Article II:1(b) (first 
sentence)?51 China argued the Panel erred in ruling this charge is 
properly characterized as an “internal charge” subject to the national 
treatment rule, rather than an OCD governed by the tariff binding 
rule. Briefly, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel finding, i.e., the 
Appellate Body agreed the charge is an “internal charge” under 
Article III:2 (first sentence), not an OCD under Article II:1(b) (first 
sentence).52 
 
2. National Treatment (Fiscal Measures) Violation? 
 
 Is the 25 percent charge illegal under GATT Article III:2 (first 
sentence)?53 China urged the Panel was wrong in holding the charge 
exceeded impositions levied on like domestic products. Briefly, the 
Appellate Body upheld the Panel. In respect of imported auto parts 
in general, it held that China’s 2004 Automobile Policy violates 
Article III:2 (first sentence) because it subjects imported parts to an 
internal charge not applied to like domestic auto parts.54 
 
3. National Treatment (Non-Fiscal Measures) Violation? 
 
 Is the 2004 Automobile Policy, through which China imposes the 25 
percent charge, illegal under GATT Article III:4?55 China claimed the 
Panel was mistaken in finding its Policy treated imported auto parts 
less favourably than like domestic merchandise. The Appellate Body 
thought China was mistaken, ruling with respect to auto parts in 
general, the Policy accords less favourable treatment to imported 
parts than to like domestic parts, and thus violates Article III:4.56 
                                                
51 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 108(a). 
52 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, Findings and Conclusions in the Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS339/AB/R (European Communities), ¶ 253(a); China Auto Parts Appellate Body 
Report, Findings and Conclusions in the Appellate Body Report WT/DS340/AB/R (United States), ¶ 
253(a); China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, Findings and Conclusions in the Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS342/AB/R (Canada), ¶ 253(a). 
53 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 108(b)(i). 
54 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, Findings and Conclusions in the Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS339/AB/R (European Communities), ¶ 253(b); China Auto Parts Appellate Body 
Report, Findings and Conclusions in the Appellate Body Report WT/DS340/AB/R (United States), ¶ 
253(b); China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, Findings and Conclusions in the Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS342/AB/R (Canada), ¶ 253(b). 
55 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 108(b)(ii). 
56 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, Findings and Conclusions in the Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS339/AB/R (European Communities), ¶ 253(c); China Auto Parts Appellate Body 
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4. Tariff Bindings Violation? 
 
 Is the 2004 Automobile Policy, through which China imposes the 25 
percent charge, illegal under GATT Article II:1(a)-(b)?57 That is, 
assuming as an arguendo the Appellate Body reverses the finding of 
the Panel that the charge is an “internal charge” under Article III:2 
(first sentence), and classifies it as an OCD under Article II:1(b) (first 
sentence), then was the Panel wrong in its alternative ruling that the 
Policy violates the Article II:1(a)-(b) tariff binding provisions? China 
faulted this alternative ruling. The Appellate Body exercised judicial 
economy, finding it unnecessary to issue a ruling on the question.58 
 
5. Accession Commitment Violation? 
 
 Is the 2004 Automobile Policy inconsistent with the conditional 
commitment China made in Paragraph 93 of its Accession Working 
Party Report not to apply a tariff rate above 10 percent to imports of 
CKD and SKD kits?59 In specific, did the Panel err in construing the 
Policy as imposing a charge on CKD and SKD kits, and was it 
mistaken to rule that China did not meet its Paragraph 93 
commitment? This holding rested on two other findings, namely, the 
Policy (1) was deemed to have created tariff lines for CKD and SKD 
kits, and (2) established separate tariff lines at the HS-10 digit level 
for these kits. Accordingly, these findings were at issue on appeal. 
Briefly, the Appellate Body sided with China, holding that the Policy 
did not impose a charge on CKD and SKD kits, and China did meet 
its accession commitments with respect to the kits.60 
 
                                                                                                                                
Report, Findings and Conclusions in the Appellate Body Report WT/DS340/AB/R (United States), ¶ 
253(c); China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, Findings and Conclusions in the Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS342/AB/R (Canada), ¶ 253(c). 
57 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 108(c). 
58 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, Findings and Conclusions in the Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS339/AB/R (European Communities), ¶ 253(d); China Auto Parts Appellate Body 
Report, Findings and Conclusions in the Appellate Body Report WT/DS340/AB/R (United States), ¶ 
253(d); China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, Findings and Conclusions in the Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS342/AB/R (Canada), ¶ 253(d). 
59 The complainants did not appeal the finding of the Panel that China acted consistently with 
GATT Article II:1(b) in classifying the kits as a complete motor vehicle and imposing a 25 percent 
charge on them. See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 211. 
60 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, Findings and Conclusions in the Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS340/AB/R (United States), ¶ 253(e); China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, 
Findings and Conclusions in the Appellate Body Report WT/DS342/AB/R (Canada), ¶ 253(e). 
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On all but the final issue, which itself was at the periphery of the case, China lost its 
appeal. Given the meticulous work of the Panel, premised on a considerable amount 
of GATT Panel and Appellate Body jurisprudence, the loss was predictable. It was 
all the more predictable because of China’s appellate argumentation. China’s 
overwhelming reliance, not well-grounded in facts, was on the claim that the 25 
percent charge was governed by GATT Article II, not Article III. Put differently, 
China gambled the same argument it made and lost at the Panel stage would 
somehow persuade the Appellate Body. 
 
 China did not appeal the finding of the Panel that its 2004 Automobile Policy 
failed to qualify for administrative necessity under GATT Article XX(d).61 That 
decision is mildly puzzling. With the gamble China took on its argument-in-chief, it 
raised the stakes on itself when it removed its only viable fallback option, namely, the 
administrative necessity defense. 
 
B. The Threshold Question: Internal Charge or OCD?62 
 
 A trade measure cannot simultaneously qualify as an “internal charge” under 
GATT Article III and an “OCD” under Article II. The measure either is imposed 
after the border (i.e., post-entry), in which case it is in the first category and governed 
by the national treatment rules, or it is imposed at the border (i.e., pre-entry), in 
which case it is in the second category and governed by the tariff binding rules. Put 
simply, a measure is either an internal tax, or a tariff, but not both. Even China 
accepted this elementary distinction.63 
 
 Thus, logically, the Appellate Body started with the question of what the 25 
percent charge is, and thereby what rules of GATT govern it. Indeed, it spent 
considerable time and effort doing so. Why did the Appellate Body agree with the 
Panel, and hold that the 25 percent charge is best characterized as a “internal charge” 
under GATT Article III:2 (first sentence)?64 
 
 The answer, in brief, is that the Panel performed its task of defining and 
delineating carefully. Following the dictates of treaty interpretation in Articles 31-32 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties65, the Panel looked to the ordinary 
meaning of the terms “internal charge” and “OCD.” It also looked to the context in 
which each term is situated. For “internal charge,” that context is the phrase 
                                                
61 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 198 fn. 282. 
62 This discussion is drawn from China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶¶ 127-182. 
63 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 184. 
64 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶¶ 181-182. 
65 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 
679 (1969) (hereinafter Vienna Convention). 
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“imported into the territory” in Article III:2 (first sentence), and the Interpretative 
Note, Ad Article III, Paragraph 2 (also called the “Ad Note”). For “OCD,” the context 
was the phrase “on their importation” in the first sentence of Article II:1(b), and the 
phrase “on or in connection with the importation” in the second sentence of Article 
II:1(b). Also informing the meaning of the two terms was the accretion of GATT 
and WTO jurisprudence, starting as far back as 1952 with the GATT Panel Report, 
Belgium – Family Allowances,66 and the 1990 GATT Panel Report in EEC – Parts and 
Components.67 
 
 On these bases, in respect of “OCD,” the Panel concluded logically as follows: 
 
[T]he ordinary meaning of “on their importation” in 
Article II:1(b), first sentence, of the GATT 1994, considered in 
its context and in light of the object and purpose of the 
GATT 1994, contains a strict and precise temporal element which 
cannot be ignored. This means that the obligation to pay 
ordinary customs duties is linked to the product at the moment 
it enters the territory of another Member…. It is at this moment, 
and this moment only, that the obligation to pay such charge 
accrues. … And it is based on the condition of the good at this 
moment that any contemporaneous or subsequent act by the 
importing country to enforce, assess or reassess, impose or 
collect ordinary customs duties should be carried out. (emphasis 
in original;  footnotes omitted) 
 
In contrast to ordinary customs duties, the obligation to pay 
internal charges does not accrue because of the importation of 
the product at the very moment it enters the territory of another 
Member but because of the internal factors (e.g., because the 
product was re-sold internally or because the product was used 
internally), which occurs once the product has been imported into 
the territory of another member. The status of the imported good, 
which does not necessarily correspond to its status at the 
moment of importation, seems to be the relevant basis to assess 
this internal charge. (emphasis in original) 68 
 
Succinctly put, said the Panel: 
 
[I]f the obligation to pay a charge does not accrue based on the 
product at the moment of its importation, it cannot be an 
                                                
66 See GATT Panel Report, Belgium – Family Allowances (Allocations Familiales), II B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) 
59 (1953, adopted 7 November 1952). This case is excerpted and discussed in RAJ BHALA, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE ch. 11 (3d ed. 2008). 
67 See GATT Panel Report, European Economic Community – Regulation on Imports of Parts and 
Components, B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) 132 (adopted 16 May 1990). 
68 China Auto Parts Panel Report, ¶¶ 7.184-7.185, quoted in China Auto Parts Appellate Body 
Report, ¶ 129. 
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“ordinary customs duty” within the meaning of Article II:1(b), 
first sentence of the GATT 1994: it is, instead, an “internal 
charge” under Article III:2 of the GATT 1994, which obligation 
to pay accrues based on internal factors.69 
 
In contrast, in respect of “internal charge,” the Appellate Body summarized the 
Panel understanding as follows: 
 
161. Like the Panel, we consider that the adjectives “internal” 
and “imported” suggest that the charges falling within the scope 
of Article III are charges that are imposed on goods that have 
already been “imported,” and that the obligation to pay them is 
triggered by an “internal” factor, something that takes place 
within the customs territory. Further, the second sentence of 
Article III:2 expressly refers to the principles set forth in 
Article III:1. The Appellate Body has stated that Article III:1 
articulates a general principle, that informs all of Article III, that 
internal measures should not be applied so as to afford 
protection to domestic production. [The Appellate Body cited its 
Report in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, 
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, 18 (adopted 1 November 
1996) (Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II).70] … 
 
162. … [I]n examining the scope of application of Article III:2, 
in relation to Article II:1(b), first sentence, the time at which a 
charge is collected or paid is not decisive. In the case of 
Article III:2, this is explicitly stated in the GATT 1994 itself, 
where the Ad Note to Article III specifies that when an internal 
charge is “collected or enforced in the case of the imported 
product at the time or point of importation,” such a charge “is 
nevertheless to be regarded” as an internal charge. What is 
important, however, is that the obligation to pay a charge must 
accrue due to an internal event, such as the distribution, sale, use 
or transportation of the imported product. 
 
163. This leads us, like the Panel, to the view that a key indicator 
of whether a charge constitutes an “internal charge” within the 
meaning of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994 is “whether the 
obligation  to pay such charge accrues because of an internal 
factor (e.g., because the product was re-sold internally or because 
the product was used internally), in the sense that such ‘internal 
factor’ occurs after the importation of the product of one Member 
into the territory of another Member.” …71 
                                                
69 China Auto Parts Panel Report, ¶ 7.204, quoted in China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 131. 
70 This case is excerpted and discussed in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE ch. 13 (3d ed. 2008). 
71 China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report ¶¶ 161-163 (citations omitted, emphases original). 
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The work of the Panel serves as an excellent tutorial – for China and indeed all 
WTO Members – on the different scope of application between the tariff binding 
and national treatment obligations in GATT, and it is no surprise the Appellate Body 
admired its analytical approach. 
 
 The boundaries between these obligations must be respected, if their distinct 
objects and purposes are to be served.72 Binding tariffs under Article II preserves the 
value of negotiated reductions in duties. Non-discriminatory treatment, with respect 
to both internal taxes and regulatory measures, under Article III is essential to avoid 
the devilish protectionist temptation to favour like domestic products over imported 
merchandise. Together, the distinct disciplines promote the objective of the 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement)73, namely, to 
promote the security and predictability of reciprocal, mutually advantageous trade-
liberalizing arrangements. 
 
 In lawyer-like fashion, the Panel then turned to the task of applying these GATT 
principles to the facts of the case. Briefly, the Panel was struck by four key facts 
about the operation of the China’s 2004 Automobile Policy: 
 
1. The obligation to pay the charge becomes ripe internally, that is, after 
the auto parts have entered the customs territory of China, and have 
been assembled into motor vehicles in China. 
 
2. The 25 percent charge is imposed on automobile manufacturers, not 
on importers. 
 
3. The charge is not levied on specific imported parts at the moment of 
importation. Rather, it is levied on specific imports based on what 
other imported or domestic parts are used together with those 
specific imports in assembling a vehicle model. 
 
4. Identical imported parts, which are imported simultaneously in the 
same container and vessel, can be subject to a different charge rate, 
depending on whether the vehicle model into which these parts are 
                                                
72 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 130 fn. 190. 
73 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, THE LEGAL 
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). This Agreement is available on the WTO website 
(www.wto.org) and reprinted in a variety of sources, including RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE – DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, Document # 8 at 
209-220 (3d ed. 2008). 
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subsequently assembled satisfies the thresholds in the criteria set out 
in the Policy. 
 
These four facts (supplemented by others, as explained below) led the Panel 
inexorably to the conclusion that the 25 percent charge is an internal one under 
GATT Article III:2 (first sentence). 
 
 Notably, China misunderstood or obscured what the Panel did and did not infer 
from these facts, particularly the first one. China suggested that the Panel had held 
that 
 
[T]he mere fact that the assembly of parts into a completed 
vehicle will necessarily occur after the parts have entered the 
customs territory means that a charge assessed on this basis is an 
internal charge.74 
 
The Appellate Body rejected this understanding.75 The Panel simply looked at when 
and where the obligation to pay the charge accrues, and weighed it with other facts. 
The small comfort for China was that the Panel excluded from this finding the 
charge on CKD and SKD kits, and found the charge on the kits was an OCD under 
the first sentence of Article II:1(b). 
 
VI. LEARNING FROM LOSING ARGUMENTS: 
CHINA’S UNSUCCESSFUL CLAIMS OF PANEL ERROR 
 
 China’s appellate argument was the Panel failed to take into account GRI 2(a) – 
the Doctrine of the Entireties, as it is known in United States customs law – which 
states: 
 
Any reference in a heading to an article shall be taken to include 
a reference to that article incomplete or unfinished, provided 
that, as presented, the incomplete or unfinished article has the 
essential character of the complete or finished article.  It shall 
also be taken to include a reference to that article complete or 
finished (or falling to be classified as complete or finished by 
virtue of this Rule), presented unassembled or disassembled.76 
 
China asserted this Rule enables customs authorities to classify unassembled auto 
parts as a complete motor vehicle, even in the situation in which the parts arrive in 
multiple shipments and the parts are assembled after importation.77 As for the text of 
                                                
74 China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 179 (emphasis in original). 
75 See id. 
76 Quoted in China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 134 fn. 197. 
77 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶¶ 134-135. 
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Article II:1(b) (first sentence), China said it requires customs authorities to determine 
what the “product” in question is, and then – following HS Rules – classify the 
product and apply the correct OCD to it. 
 
 Specifically, China accused the Panel of three mistakes. First, the Panel ought not 
to have separated the (1) threshold question of whether the 25 percent charge is an 
OCD from (2) question of whether China is authorized to apply GRI 2(a) to multiple 
entries of auto parts. The 25 percent charge is inextricably linked to valid 
classification procedures under HS Rules. The Panel should have examined the two 
questions simultaneously, not sequentially. 
 
 Second, the Panel wrongly refused to characterize the 25 percent charge as an 
“OCD” under Article II:1(b) (first sentence). China urged it is impossible to decide 
whether its charge is an OCD without taking proper account of the term “product” 
in that Article, in light of the classification rules of the HS, like GRI 2(a). China 
conceded Article II:1(b) (first sentence) emphasizes the moment of importation as 
pertinent to ascertaining whether a charge is an “OCD.” But, no less relevant is the 
“condition,” or “status,” of the product at the moment it enters the importing 
country. GRI 2(a) is needed to determine whether the condition of status of a 
completely unassembled motor vehicle at that moment permits, or not, the parts to 
be classified as a complete vehicle. In essence, the Panel erred by neglecting to use 
the HS Rule to interpret the significant GATT terms. 
 
 Third, China claimed, the Panel erroneously dubbed the 25 percent charge an 
“internal charge” under GATT Article III:2 (first sentence). China insisted that the 
fact that auto parts are assembled into a completed vehicle after importation does 
not mean the 25 percent charge is governed by that provision. In other words, China 
faulted the Panel for making too much of the time and place of assembly – after 
importation, post-border. All three claims of Panel error were related, and to some 
degree China’s style of argumentation – as recounted by the Appellate Body – lacks 
the clarity and precision expected of a sophisticated presentation. 
 
A. Wrongful Separation of Issues 
 
 China’s argument about the first error it contended the Panel made was a post hoc 
rationalization for the 25 percent charge. Conceptually, its argument made no sense. 
As the United States, Canada, and the EU all rightly pointed out, to accept China’s 
position would be to “blur,” or “confuse,” the threshold issue of what provision of 
GATT governs the controversial 25 percent charge with the distinct question of 
whether the charge is consistent with that provision.78 China puts the “cart before 
                                                
78 China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 136. 
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the horse” by presuming the charge is an OCD, when that is the first question in 
need of analysis.79 
 
 Unsurprisingly, the Appellate Body sided with the Panel and complainants: 
 
In its appeal, China challenges the Panel’s decision to analyze the 
threshold issue separately from the issue of the consistency of 
the measures with Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. Yet, as the 
Appellate Body has previously observed, the “fundamental 
structure and logic” of a covered agreement may require panels 
to determine whether a measure falls within the scope of a 
particular provision or covered agreement before proceeding to 
assess the consistency of the measure with the substantive 
obligations imposed under that provision or covered agreement. 
[The Appellate Body cited its Reports in Canada – Certain 
Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, 
WT/DS142/AB/R ¶ 151 (adopted 19 June 2000) (Canada – 
Autos) (quoting Appellate Body Report, United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R 
¶ 119 (adopted 6 November 1998) (U.S. – Shrimp)), and United 
States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R, I, 3, 20 (adopted 20 May 1996 (US – 
Gasoline).80] We consider this to be just such a case, particularly in 
the light of the Panel’s observation – with which China expressly 
agrees – that “a charge cannot be at the same time an ‘ordinary 
customs duty’ under Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 and an 
‘internal tax or other internal charge’ under Article III:2 of the 
GATT.” If, as the Panel considered, the charge imposed on 
automobile manufacturers could fall within the scope of either 
the first sentence of Article II:1(b) or Article III:2, then the Panel 
had to begin its analysis by ascertaining which of these provisions 
applied in the circumstances of this dispute.81 
 
In sum, the Appellate Body approved of the sequential methodology of the Panel to 
treat the threshold issue of “what GATT rule applies?” before considering “did the 
25 percent charge violate the rule?”82 
                                                
79 China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 136. 
80 The Auto Pact case is excerpted and discussed in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE ch. 11 (3d ed. 2008). The Shrimp and Gasoline cases are 
excerpted and discussed in id., ch. 43. 
81 China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 139 (emphasis in original). 
82 Neither side in the case, at either the Panel or Appellate stage, argued the 25 percent charge 
qualified for the phrase of GATT Article II:1(b) (second sentence) as “all other duties and charges 
[ODC] of any kind imposed on or in connection with the importation” of the product in question. In 
other words, the dispute was whether the 25 percent charge fell within the first sentence of Article 
II:1(b) as an OCD, not whether it was an ODC under the second sentence. Likewise, there was no 
dispute as to the delineation between an OCD and ODC. The Appellate Body said that in deciding 
whether a particular charge falls under Article III:2 as an “internal charge,” or under Article II:1(b) 
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B. Using the GRI as Context to Interpret GATT 
 
 As to the second error China contended the Panel made, here, too, the Appellate 
Body looked approvingly at the work of the Panel, and quoted generously from it. 
There is a strict, precise temporal element to Article II:1(b) (first sentence). That is 
clear from the terms surrounding “OCD” that indicate an “OCD” is imposed on 
“products, on their importation.”83 If a charge does not accrue at the moment of 
importation, it is not an OCD. China cited an Appellate Body precedent, EC – 
Chicken Cuts, in which the Appellate Body agreed it is permissible to examine the HS 
as context for interpretation of a GATT–WTO text, even though the HS is not 
technically part of the accords annexed to the WTO Agreement (i.e., it is not a covered 
agreement):84 
 
In EC – Chicken Cuts, the Appellate Body considered the issue of 
whether the Harmonized System could constitute context for 
the interpretation of a term in the European Communities’ 
Schedule of Concessions. The Appellate Body pointed out that, 
although the Harmonized System is not formally part of the 
WTO Agreement, there is nonetheless a close link between that 
System and the covered agreements. The Appellate Body 
explained that: 
 
... prior to, during, as well as after the Uruguay 
Round negotiations, there was broad 
consensus among the GATT Contracting 
Parties to use the Harmonized System as the 
basis for their WTO Schedules, notably with 
respect to agricultural products. In our view, 
this consensus constitutes an “agreement” 
between WTO Members “relating to” 
the WTO Agreement that was “made in 
connection with the conclusion of” that 
Agreement, within the meaning of 
Article 31(2)(a) of the Vienna Convention.  As 
such, this agreement is “context” under 
Article 31(2)(a) for the purpose of interpreting 
the WTO agreements, of which the 
                                                                                                                                
(first sentence) as an “OCD,” it would be helpful to examine the meaning of “ODC.” That would 
produce a complete understanding of the architecture of Articles II and III. But, the Panel’s choice 
not to study ODC neither affected the outcome of the case (because China said no products at issue 
in the case were affected by an ODC), nor was it reversible error. See China Auto Parts Appellate Body 
Report, ¶ 140. 
83 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 153 (quoting GATT Article II:1(b)). 
84 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken 
Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R (adopted 27 September 2005). This case is discussed in 
Raj Bhala & David Gantz, WTO Case Review 2005, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 107-345 (2006). 
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EC Schedule is an integral part.  In this light, 
we consider that the Harmonized System is 
relevant for purposes of interpreting tariff 
commitments in the WTO Members’ 
Schedules. (emphasis in original)85 
 
However, the complainants astutely observed that China made too much of this 
precedent. It relates to the use of the HS only to interpret a term in a Schedule of 
Concessions, not a term in a GATT–WTO rule. 
 
 The Appellate Body agreed with the view of the complainants on EC – Chicken 
Cuts: 
 
The negotiators of the WTO Agreement used the Harmonized 
System as the basis for negotiating Members’ Schedules of 
Concessions, and included express references to the 
Harmonized System in certain covered agreements for purposes 
of defining product coverage of those agreements or specific 
provisions thereof.  It follows that the Harmonized System is 
context for purposes of interpreting the covered agreements, in 
particular for the classification of products under Schedules of 
Concessions and for defining the product coverage of certain 
covered agreements. This is what the Appellate Body found in 
EC – Chicken Cuts. Yet this does not answer the question of 
whether the Harmonized System is context that is relevant to the 
determination of whether a charge is an ordinary customs duty 
or an internal charge.86 
 
As to the latter question, the Appellate Body looked to the direction of Article 31(2) 
of the Vienna Convention, which states: 
 
The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and 
annexes: 
 
 (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made 
between all the parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty; 
 
 (b) any instrument which was made by one or more 
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty 
and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty.87 
 
                                                
85 China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 146. 
86 China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 148 (citation omitted). 
87 Quoted in China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 150. 
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The Appellate Body explained that context must be relevant to the interpretative 
question at issue. 
 
 As the Schedule of Concessions of every WTO Member is constructed using the 
HS, the rules of the HS are relevant context for discerning the meaning of a term in 
a Schedule. Thus, if the question in the case at hand was whether China could 
classify auto parts as complete motor vehicles, then it would be necessary to interpret 
China’s Schedule. Yet, that is not the question. The key matter – to which the HS 
rules are not pertinent – is defining “OCD” and “internal charge” under GATT 
Articles II:(1)(b) and III:2 (first sentence), respectively. 
 
155. … The Harmonized System categorizes products, and the 
characteristics of particular products are relevant to how they are 
categorized. We recognize, as China argues, that classification, 
and hence the tariff rate applied, might, in some circumstances, 
vary depending on the condition of goods at the moment of 
importation. Since different categories of products are subject to 
different bound and applied tariff rates, the classification of a 
given product may affect the amount of the duty imposed. 
Accordingly, classification issues have some bearing on the 
question of whether a Member applying such a duty is in 
conformity with its obligation, under Article II:1(b), not to 
impose duties in excess of the bound rate set out in the 
Member’s Schedule for the product concerned. Yet this issue 
(whether a duty applied to a product by virtue of its classification 
is consistent with Article II:1(b)) is separate from the issue of 
whether a charge falls under the first sentence of Article II:1(b) at 
all (as opposed to under Article III:2). It is not evident to us how 
classification rules are relevant to the latter issue. While it is true, 
as China argues, that the “classification of the product 
necessarily precedes the determination of which ‘ordinary 
customs duty’ applies,” it is not the case that classification of the 
product (even if properly done) necessarily precedes a 
determination of whether the charge that applies is an ordinary 
customs duty. 
 … 
 
158. Yet we fail to see how the Panel erred in not relying on 
GIR 2(a) in resolving the threshold issue of whether the charge 
imposed under the measures at issue is an ordinary customs duty 
or an internal charge. The right of a WTO Member to impose a 
customs duty, and the obligation of an importer to pay such a 
duty, accrue at the very moment the product enters the customs 
territory of that Member and by virtue of the event of 
importation.  In contrast, the classification rules according to 
which customs authorities determine under which tariff heading 
the “product” concerned falls, depending on its “status” or 
“condition,” are not relevant to the nature of the “duty” itself 
because they do not determine the moment at which the obligation 
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to pay accrues, but only the amount of that duty. Similarly, as all 
of the participants agree, the moment at which a charge is collected 
or paid is not determinative of whether it is an ordinary customs 
duty or an internal charge. Ordinary customs duties may be 
collected after the moment of importation, and internal charges 
may be collected at the moment of importation. For a charge to 
constitute an ordinary customs duty, however, the obligation to 
pay it must accrue at the moment and by virtue of or, in the 
words of Article II:1(b), “on,” importation. 
 … 
 
163. … We also observe that the Harmonized System does not 
serve as relevant context for the interpretation of the term 
“internal charges” in Article III:2. 
  
164. In sum, we see the Harmonized System as context that is 
most relevant to issues of classification of products.  The 
Harmonized System complements Members’ Schedules and 
confirms the general principle that [as the Appellate Body stated 
in EC – Chicken Cuts] it is “the ‘objective characteristics’ of the 
product in question when presented for classification at the 
border” that determine their classification and, consequently, the 
applicable customs duty. The Harmonized System, and the 
product categories that it contains, cannot trump the criteria 
contained in Article II:1(b) and Article III:2, which distinguish a 
border measure from an internal charge under the GATT 1994. 
Among WTO Members, it is these GATT provisions that 
prevail, and that define the relevant characteristics of ordinary 
customs duties for WTO purposes. Thus, even if the 
Harmonized System and GIR 2(a) would allow auto parts 
imported in multiple shipments to be classified as complete 
vehicles based on subsequent common assembly, as China 
suggests, this would not per se affect the criteria that define an 
ordinary customs duty under Article II:1(b). … 
… 
 
166. … [A] determination of whether a particular charge falls 
under Article II:1(b) or Article III:2 of the GATT 1994 must be 
based on a proper interpretation of these two provisions. The 
Harmonized System does not provide context that is relevant to 
the threshold question or to the assessment of the respective 
scope of application of “ordinary customs duties” in the first 
sentence of Article II:1(b) and “internal charges” in Article III:2 
of the GATT 1994 that must be undertaken in answering that 
question. It follows that the Panel did not err in interpreting the 
term “ordinary customs duties” in the first sentence of 
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Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 without relying on the rules of 
the Harmonized System, in general, or GIR 2(a), in particular.88 
 
The above-quoted paragraphs may be distilled as follows: The essence of 
China’s appellate argument was that China correctly classified the “product” – a 
completed vehicle – under GRI 2(a), thus its 25 percent charge must be an “OCD” 
under Article II:1(b) (first sentence). But, “must be” and “is” are not the same. It is 
specious to conflate tariff classification under HS Rules, and the related matter of 
respect for tariff bindings under Article II:1(b) (first sentence), with the 
characterization of a charge as an “OCD” under that Article. Just because 
classification is done properly (a completed vehicle despite dissembled parts), and a 
charge imposed (25 percent), does not make that charge an OCD. As for the HS 
Rules, they are context most relevant to product classification, but they are not 
context that supersedes the language of GATT. 
 
 To this finding and rationale the Appellate Body added a consequential 
justification, one suggested by the Panel.89 Suppose China’s argument were accepted: 
a 25 percent charge imposed on auto parts following, and as a result of, their 
assembly into a completed vehicle, constitutes an OCD. The consequence would be 
that whether any charge is an OCD would depend on circumstances that transpire 
after the border, rather than solely on the moment of (and by virtue of) importation. 
The distinction between border and post-border would collapse, because what 
happens after importation would affect characterization of a charge at the border. 
Stated differently, the scope of “OCD” and Article II:1(b) (first sentence) would 
expand, but the scope of “internal charges” and Article III:2 (first sentence) would 
contract. The latter consequence would enervate the highly important national 
treatment discipline, and upset the balanced structure so carefully arranged by the 
GATT drafters and elaborated on through GATT and WTO adjudication. 
 
C. Not Really an Internal Charge 
 
 Obviously, with the Appellate Body upholding the decision of the Panel that 
China’s 25 percent levy was not an “OCD” under GATT Article II:1(b) (first 
sentence), the proper categorization was an “internal charge” under Article III:2 (first 
sentence). That categorization – said China – was the third error made by the Panel. 
The Appellate Body did not agree, and found no fault with the work of the Panel. 
 
 The Panel rightly scrutinized all relevant characteristics of the 25 percent charge, 
particularly its design and operation. That scrutiny enabled the Panel to identify the 
                                                
88 China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶¶ 155, 158, 163-164, 166 (citations omitted, 
emphases original). 
89 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 165. 
Spring, 2009]                                                       Teaching China GATT  37 
“center of gravity” of the charge based on its “core” or “leading” features, an 
essential task because some aspects may point to a conclusion that this charge is an 
“OCD,” while others suggest it is an “internal charge.” The Panel also correctly 
examined the circumstances under which China imposed the 25 percent charge. In 
brief, the Panel correctly followed the teaching of the Appellate Body in India – 
Additional Import Duties, a case concerning whether a measure was governed by 
Article II:2(a) or the Ad Note to Article III.90 
 
 As summarized by the Appellate Body, the characteristics of the 25 percent 
charge that impressed the Panel, and persuaded it that the charge was not an “OCD” 
governed by Article II:1(b) (first sentence): 
 
172. … The Panel identified the following characteristics of the 
charge as having particular significance for legal characterization 
purposes: (i) the obligation to pay the charge accrues internally 
after auto parts have entered the customs territory of China and 
have been assembled/produced into motor vehicles; (ii) the 
charge is imposed on automobile manufacturers rather than on 
importers in general; (iii) the charge is imposed based on how 
the imported auto parts are used, that is, not based on the auto 
parts as they enter, but instead based on what other parts from 
other countries and/or other importers and/or domestic parts 
are subsequently used, together with those imported parts, in 
assembling a vehicle model; and (iv) the fact that identical auto 
parts imported at the same time in the same container or vessel 
can be subject to different charge rates depending on which 
vehicle model they are assembled into. 
 
173. We agree with the Panel as to the legal significance of these 
features of the measures at issue. Furthermore, there are 
additional characteristics of the charge imposed under the 
measures that the Panel recognized, and that support its 
characterization of that charge as an internal charge falling 
within the scope of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994.  Foremost 
among these is the fact that it is not the declaration made at the 
time of importation, but rather the declaration of duty payment 
made subsequent to the assembly/production of complete 
motor vehicles, that determines whether the charge will be 
applied. 
 
174. That the declaration made at the time of importation does 
not control or necessarily affect whether the charge under the 
measures will ultimately be applied to specific imported parts is 
illustrated most prominently in the scenario where an 
                                                
90 See Appellate Body Report, India – Additional Import and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from the 
United States, WT/DS360/AB/R (adopted 17 November 2008). This case is reviewed in Raj Bhala & 
David Gantz, WTO Case Review 2008, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. (2009). 
                                                            Trade, Law and Development                                                         [Vol. 1:1 38 
automobile manufacturer does not import parts directly, but 
instead purchases them from an independent third party supplier 
within China. In such circumstances, the third party supplier 
imports and declares those auto parts at the border and pays a 
10 per cent duty.  Yet those same parts may subsequently be 
subject to the 25 per cent charge – imposed after assembly – if 
they are sold to an automobile manufacturer and assembled into 
a vehicle model that meets the thresholds set out in the measures 
at issue. 
 
175. In addition, there are at least two circumstances in which 
imported auto parts that are not characterized as complete 
vehicles or declared as such at the moment of importation will 
nonetheless be subject to the charge under the measures at issue 
following vehicle assembly: (i) when imported auto parts are 
installed on a vehicle as options (that is, such parts were not 
mentioned in the self-evaluation or Verification Report because 
they are not installed on the baseline models of the particular 
vehicle model in question), the manufacturer must report the 
options to the Verification Centre and make declarations for 
purposes of paying the charge at the time of the actual 
installation of the optional parts; and (ii) when, following re-
verification due to an increase in the combinations or value of 
imported parts vis-à-vis domestic parts, a vehicle model that 
previously did not meet the criteria under the measures at issue 
is determined to meet those criteria, the imported parts used in 
the production/assembly of that model must be declared after 
assembly, and will then be subject to the charge. 
 
176. There are also at least two circumstances in which auto 
parts that are characterized as complete vehicles and declared as 
such at the time of importation will not attract the 25 per cent 
charge under the measures at issue, namely: (i) when imported 
parts that are characterized as complete vehicles in the 
declaration made at the time of importation are not 
assembled/produced into complete vehicles within 12 months, 
they must be declared within 30 days of the expiration of the 
12-month period and will be subject to a 10 per cent charge, 
rather than the 25 per cent charge that would otherwise apply 
under the measures at issue; and (ii) when, following re-
verification due to a decrease in the combinations or value of 
imported parts vis-à-vis domestic parts, a vehicle model that 
previously met the criteria under the measures at issue is 
determined no longer to meet those criteria, the imported parts 
used in the assembly/production of that model will not be 
subject to the charge under the measures at issue.91 
 
                                                
91 China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶¶ 172-176. 
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Even a quick read of these characteristics indicates the facts weighed heavily 
against China’s argument of Panel error. Were there any countervailing facts 
supporting the proposition that the 25 percent charge was an “OCD”? 
 
 Indeed, there were four characteristics China stressed: 
 
(i) the measures at issue use language typically reserved for 
references to “ordinary customs duties;” (ii) China’s explanation 
of the policy purpose of the measures, and that the charge 
imposed thereunder “objectively relate[s] to the administration 
and enforcement of China’s tariff provisions for motor 
vehicles;” (iii) China’s view that parts imported directly by an 
automobile manufacturer remain subject to customs control 
until after assembly/production of the relevant vehicle model; 
and (iv) the measures at issue and the charge imposed 
thereunder are administered primarily by China’s customs 
authorities.92 
 
Here, again, even a glance at these characteristics reveals the weakness of the Chinese 
argument. None of them individually, or taken in aggregate, are persuasive enough to 
offset the features pointing toward classifying the 25 percent charge under Article 
III:2 (first sentence). 
 
 The first feature is a matter of labeling by China. A WTO Member can 
manipulate rubrics to suit its ends, but the job of a panel or the Appellate Body is to 
see through formalistic labels and look to underlying substantive reality. That is clear 
from Appellate Body precedent in Softwood Lumber IV.93 The second feature is 
China’s perspective. Legislative intent is difficult to discern, especially by external 
adjudicators, and is not conclusive. That is apparent from the Appellate Body 
decision in the Byrd Amendment case.94 The third feature actually cuts against China’s 
argument. Imported auto parts are not physically confined or otherwise restricted by 
customs authorities, and can be used freely in China’s internal market. That is, 
importation of these parts under the financial guarantee of a bond hardly amounts to 
“ongoing customs control.” The fourth feature is a matter of China’s internal 
administrative edifice. Decisive weight about interpreting a provision of GATT 
                                                
92 China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 177. 
93 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to 
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R ¶ 56 (adopted 17 February 2004). This 
decision is reviewed in Raj Bhala & David Gantz, WTO Case Review 2004, 22 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 99-249 (2005). 
94 See United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, 
WT/DS/234/AB/R ¶ 259 (adopted 27 January 2003). This decision is reviewed in RAJ BHALA, 
MODERN GATT LAW ch. 29 sec. X (2005), and in Raj Bhala & David Gantz, WTO Case Review 2003, 
21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 317-439 (2004). 
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cannot be given to a point, like governmental structure, which is wholly under the 
control of a WTO Member. That is manifest in the 1990 EEC – Parts and Components 
GATT Panel Report.95 The fourth feature cited by China also is not the whole truth. 
Other organs of the CCP – the Ministries of Commerce and Finance, and the 
NDRC, and the Verification Centre – have official roles in the administration of the 
25 percent charge.  
 
VII. LEARNING FROM VIOLATIONS: WHAT CHINA GOT WRONG 
 
A. National Treatment 
 
 With the 25 percent charge clearly characterized as an “internal charge,” the next 
question concerned its consistency with the governing provision, GATT Article III:2 
(first sentence). China made the job of the Appellate Body easy.96 At no point in the 
case did China contend the imported and domestic auto parts were not like products. 
Further, China admitted that if the charge was an internal one, then it violated Article 
III:2 (first sentence). Indubitably, the 25 percent charge was in excess of levies 
imposed on like domestic products. In other words, once China lost the debate to 
slot the charge as an “OCD” under Article II:1(b) (first sentence), it lost the debate 
about compliance with national treatment and fiscal measures.97 
 
 There is, of course, a second national treatment obligation. GATT Article III:4 
covers all non-fiscal measures. The United States, Canada, and EU all successfully 
persuaded the Panel that the China’s 2004 Automobile Policy was an internal one 
within the ambit of this obligation, and was incongruous with it. That success carried 
through to the Appellate Body. The focus of this debate was on the regulatory 
requirements in the Policy that require all vehicle manufacturers in China to register, 
and provide a listing and detailed records to Chinese customs authorities if they use 
imported auto parts. 
 
 China’s losing argument on Article III:4 was essentially the same as on Article 
III:2 (first sentence): the 2004 Auto Policy imposes an “OCD,” so the correct rule to 
apply is Article II:1(b) (first sentence). Additionally, the administrative procedures 
for implementing the Policy are associated with the imposition of an OCD, and 
should be viewed as customs measures to implement the classification rules of the 
HS, not internal rules governed by Article III:4. Not surprisingly, with little effort, 
the Appellate Body rejected the Chinese argument in Article III:4 context, as it had 
                                                
95 The key relevant parts of the decision are ¶¶ 5.6-5.7, and the case is cited supra. 
96 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶¶ 183-186. 
97 As explained below, the Article III:2 finding of the Appellate Body, like that of the Panel, 
excluded the imposition of the 25 percent charge on CKD and SKD kits. See China Auto Parts 
Appellate Body Report, ¶ 186 fn. 259. 
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in the Article III:2 (first sentence) context.98 Manifestly, China had too much 
confidence in its characterization that the 25 percent charge, and the measures by 
which China administered the charge, were governed by Article II:1(b) (first 
sentence). Once China lost that debate, most of its case crumbled. 
 
 To be sure, China put up one argument on which the Appellate Body paused.99 
China said the Panel was wrong to find that the 2004 Automobile Policy influences 
the choice by an automobile manufacturer between domestic and imported auto 
parts, and thus affect the internal use of imported parts. China said the influence is 
created by the differential tariff structure, namely, a 10 percent bound duty on parts, 
and a 25 percent bound rate for completed vehicles. The Panel wrongly premised an 
Article III:4 violation on an inherent feature of China’s Schedule of Concessions. 
There is nothing illegal about discriminating against imported auto parts merely 
through the imposition of a customs duty validly imposed under GATT rules, i.e., 
those rules countenance one kind of discrimination – tariffs. 
 
 Unfortunately for China, it again misunderstood or obfuscated what the Panel 
had ruled.100 The difference in bound rates for auto parts and completed vehicles in 
China’s Schedule was not the discrimination concerning internal use of imported 
auto parts on which the Panel relied to find a violation of GATT Article III:4. 
Rather, the Panel looked to the measures at issue, especially the incentives created 
for car manufacturers by the volume thresholds (i.e., the use of designated assemblies 
or combinations of assemblies) and value thresholds (i.e., the 60 percent test). Those 
thresholds determine whether China characterizes imported auto parts as complete 
vehicles. For an automobile manufacturer to avoid the 25 percent charge for a 
completed vehicle (and instead qualify for a 10 percent duty on parts), it must ensure 
the imported parts it uses to assemble a vehicle model are below the thresholds. 
Moreover, if a manufacturer exceeds the thresholds, then the 25 percent charge 
applies to all imported parts it uses in the vehicle model in question. Further, if a 
manufacturer exceeds the thresholds, then it is subject to tracking and reporting 
requirements, and attendant delays, concerning auto parts imported in multiple 
shipments. 
 
 Quite obviously, these realities are incentives for a manufacturer to limit its use 
of imported relative to domestic parts, and they “‘affect’ the conditions of competition for 
imported auto parts on the Chinese internal market.”101 The Panel was on solid 
ground, citing the U.S. – FSC (Article 21:5 – EC) decision of the Appellate Body, 
which explained that an incentive for a manufacturer not to use imported inputs 
                                                
98 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 189. 
99 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶¶ 190-197. 
100 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 192. 
101 China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 195 (emphasis supplied). 
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affects the internal use of imported products, and thus violates Article III:4. That 
decision, plus long-standing jurisprudence under this Article, emphasizes the 
importance of not tilting the competitive playing field against foreign vis-à-vis like 
domestic products. That lesson may be especially important for a Communist 
country like China claiming it no longer is a non-market economy (NME). 
 
B. Tariff Bindings 
 
 The United States, Canada, and EC convinced the Panel to reach an alternative 
finding, namely, if the 25 percent charge were an “OCD,” then China violated 
GATT Article II:1(a)-(b) by exceeding the bound rates for auto parts in its Schedule 
of Concessions.102 Why did the Panel agree to embark on the alternative analysis in 
the first place? It looked out to the demands of the parties, and up to the Appellate 
Body. The complainants and China disagreed on whether the charge violated this 
Article, so an issue was joined. There was the specter (perhaps remote) that the 
Appellate Body might overturn its finding under Article III:2 (first sentence), as the 
line between and “OCD” and an “internal charge” is not always bright.103 
 
 The Panel sided with the complainants, stating: 
 
... the tariff provisions for motor vehicles (87.02-87.05) of 
China’s Schedule of Concessions do not include in their scope 
auto parts imported in multiple shipments based on their 
assembly into a motor vehicle. Accordingly, to the extent the 
measures could be considered as falling within the scope of 
Article II of the GATT 1994, China’s measures have the effect 
of imposing ordinary customs duties on imported auto parts in 
excess of the concessions contained in the tariff headings for 
auto parts under its Schedule, inconsistently with its obligations 
under Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994.104 
 
The Panel premised this alternative finding on more than just the interpretation of 
“motor vehicles” in China’s Schedule of Concessions. The criteria China applied to 
determine whether imports parts have the essential character of a completed vehicle 
also indicate China accords less favourable treatment to imported auto parts than it 
promises in its Schedule. 
 
 China’s appeal raised serious systemic concerns, and the United States and EC 
expressly stated as much.105 These two complainants sought a complete examination 
                                                
102 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 198. 
103 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 198 fn. 283. 
104 Quoted in China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 199. 
105 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶¶ 204-208. 
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by the Appellate Body of the alternative finding of the Panel, so as to leave no doubt 
about the inconsistency of China’s 25 percent charge under GATT Article II. China 
posited two different scenarios. First, trotting out its old argument, China urged the 
Appellate Body to reverse the Panel, and hold the 25 percent charge is an “OCD” 
under GATT Article II:1(b) (first sentence). If the Appellate Body does so, then it 
will see the charge is based on a valid classification of imported auto parts under GRI 
2(a) as a completed vehicle – hence, the charge is not a duty in excess of China’s 
tariff binding. This scenario, of course, did not materialize. Second, on the 
assumption that the Appellate Body upheld the conclusion of the Panel that the 25 
percent charge was an internal one governed by Article III:2 (first sentence), China 
called upon the Appellate Body to declare the alternative finding of the Panel to be 
moot and of no legal effect. Seeing no reason to do so, the Appellate Body rejected 
that call.106 In sum, leaving the Panel’s alternative finding alone, the Appellate Body 
did the bidding of neither the complainants nor China. 
 
VIII. THREE PERSPECTIVES 
 
A. China Kept its Accession Promise 
 
 Promises made by a country to get into the WTO are not political campaign 
promises. Rather, they have legal consequences. They create an obligation 
enforceable under GATT–WTO law, specifically through the DSU.107 That is true 
for a pledge set out in the Working Party Report on the accession of that Member, and 
for one set out in the Protocol of Accession. As the Diagram below indicates, the 
Accession Protocol itself states it is an integral part of the WTO Agreement. For example, 
this link is made in Part I, Article 1.2, of China’s Accession Protocol. In turn, a Working 
Party Report incorporates into the Accession Protocol any commitment an acceding 
country makes in that Report. In China’s case, Paragraph 342 of the Working Party 
Report incorporates China’s promises in that Report, including Paragraph 93 
concerning the 10 percent tariff on CKD and SKD kits. 
 
 Consequently, when faced with the issue of whether a Member has broken a 
promise it made to join the WTO, a WTO adjudicator can – indeed, must – apply 
the Article 31-32 Vienna Convention rules on treaty interpretation to Working Party 
Reports and Accession Protocols. That is exactly what the Panel and Appellate Body did 
in the Auto Parts case. The Panel held that China broke its promise not to apply a 
tariff rate in excess of 10 percent on CKD and SKD units.108 China appealed on 
three grounds. 
                                                
106 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶¶ 203, 209. 
107 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶¶ 213-214. 
108 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 215. 
                                                            Trade, Law and Development                                                         [Vol. 1:1 44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1: Legal Linkages among WTO Accession Commitments and the WTO Agreement 
 
 First, China said the Panel was wrong to characterize its 2004 Automobile Policy 
as imposing a “charge” or “duty” on an automobile manufacturer importing a CKD 
or SKD unit that declares the kit, and pays duties, at the border.109 In fact, the Policy 
excludes the kits from both administrative procedures (e.g., declarations, bonding 
requirements, tracking, reporting, and verifications) and the 25 percent charge. True, 
the kits attract a 25 percent duty – but that is the MFN rate in China’s Schedule of 
Concessions for completed vehicles, not the 25 percent charge under the Policy. In 
brief, the Policy entirely excludes the kits, and the basis for imposing the duty is 
Chinese customs law. So, it was illogical for the Panel to say China’s Policy as applied 
to the kits violated its accession commitments. 
 
 The Panel ruled that China misread or misunderstood its own Policy. The Panel 
examined carefully the relevant language in it (especially Articles 2(1)-(2) and 21 of 
Decree 125). An auto manufacturer importing a CKD or SKD kit has the option to 
exclude them from the administrative procedures attendant with the Policy, declare 
the kit at the border, and pay a 25 percent charge on the kit as a completed vehicle. 
A manufacturer exercising this option is not relieved from the obligation to pay the 
charge, but rather the red-tape associated with paying the charge later, after it 
assembles the vehicle at a post-border location. This option is why the Panel 
excluded CKD and SKD kits from its ruling under GATT Article III:2 (first 
sentence). If an importer chooses to declare and pay duties on a kit at the border, 
then the 25 percent charge it pays is a result of the operation of the Policy, not an 
internal charge subject to the national treatment rule. Additionally, held the Panel, 
the Chinese Policy created new tariff lines, at the HS 10-digit level, for CKD and 
SKD kits. The 25 percent charge on the kits is associated with those new lines. 
 
                                                
109 See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶¶ 216-245. 
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 The logical consequence of this reasoning was that China violated its Paragraph 
93 accession commitment. Under its 2004 Automobile Policy, China imposed a tariff 
on CKD and SKD units higher than 10 percent. Existing WTO Members 
negotiating with China for its accession specifically anticipated China, once it joined 
the WTO, might try to treat the kits as completed vehicles. Doing so, they feared, 
would impede access to China’s internal market – the 15 percentage point differential 
is a hefty cost for automobile manufacturers importing the kits. Thus, China was 
asked – and agreed – to hold the line at 10 percent. 
 
 The Appellate Body did not accept the finding and rationale of the Panel.110 
Reviewing the same language in the 2004 Automobile Policy, the Appellate Body 
said China had established (especially in Decree 125) a special, seamless regime of 
administrative procedures and the 25 percent charge covering imported auto parts 
characterized as a complete vehicle. The procedures and the charge were inseparable. 
A CKD and SKD kit that is declared for and paid at the border is exempt from that 
regime. The 25 percent tariff China levies on the kit is – as China argued – a 
consequence not of the special regime, but rather arises under normal customs law. 
That is the MFN tariff on a finished car under China’s Schedule governed by GATT 
Article II:1(b). The Appellate Body also faulted the Panel for not properly 
scrutinizing the key characteristics of the 25 percent charge in the context of CKD 
and SKD imports.111 That failure was an asymmetry in the Panel Report. The Panel 
did study these characteristics in its threshold analysis under GATT Articles II:1(b) 
(first sentence) and III:2(b) (first sentence). 
 
 The “bottom line” was that China did not violate its Paragraph 93 accession 
commitment about a 10 percent cap on tariffs applied to SKD and CKD kits. The 
finding of the Panel that China broke its promise rested on an erroneous reading by 
the Panel that the 25 percent charge on imported kits arises under China’s 2004 
Automobile Policy. It does not. China’s Policy is a seamless web. A declaration of a 
                                                
110  See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶¶ 235-245. 
 Interestingly, the Appellate Body rejected an American argument that construction by a WTO 
panel of municipal law is a factual determination that is not subject to review under DSU Article 17:6. 
Citing its Reports in U.S. – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R ¶ 105 
(adopted 1 February 2002), and India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products, WT/DS50/AB/R ¶¶ 65-66, 68 (adopted 16 January 1998), the Appellate Body pointed out 
municipal law is not only evidence of facts, but also of compliance (or the lack thereof) with 
international legal obligations. Thus, if a panel interprets municipal law to determine whether a 
Member has complied with its WTO obligations, then the finding of the panel is a legal one, subject 
to Appellate Body review. See id., ¶¶ 224-226. The Section 211 case is discussed in Raj Bhala & David 
Gantz, WTO Case Review 2002, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 143-289 (2003). The India Patent case is 
excerpted and discussed in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY 
AND PRACTICE ch. 49 (3d ed. 2008). 
111  See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 243. 
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kit as a complete vehicle at the border exempts the declarer from both the 
administrative procedures and 25 percent charge arising under the Policy. The 
declaration subjects the kits to payment of a 25 percent duty under China’s Schedule. 
In effect, Paragraph 93 is irrelevant to such kits. The charge on the kits is nothing 
more than an OCD – the MFN duty – governed by Article II:1(b) (first sentence). 
Here, China kept its promise.112 
 
B. China (Hopefully) Learned the Golden Rule 
 
 The drafters of GATT showed considerable foresight in making as a pillar of 
their document the national treatment principle. They knew well that if a 
government is prone to discriminate, then it is highly likely to prefer its domestic 
producers against foreign competitors. GATT Article III is nothing less than the 
international trade law equivalent of the Golden Rule. One version, in the Judeo–
Christian tradition, is found in the Old Testament: 
 
Do to no one what you yourself dislike. Give to the hungry some of 
your bread, and to the naked some of your clothing. Seek counsel 
from every wise man. At all times bless the Lord God, and ask him 
to make all your paths straight and to grant success to all your 
endeavors and plans.113 
 
The New Testament expression is in the Gospel according to Matthew: 
 
34When the Pharisees heard that he [Jesus] had silenced the 
Sadducees, they gathered together, 35and one of them [a scholar 
of the law] tested him by asking, 36”Teacher, which 
commandment in the law is the greatest?” 37He said to him, 
“You shall have the Lord, your God, with all your heart, with all 
your soul, and with all your mind. 38This is the greatest and the 
first commandment. 39The second is like it: You shall love your 
neighbour as yourself. 40The whole law and the prophets depend on 
these two commandments.”114 
 
By no means, of course, is the Golden Rule uniquely Christian. It is expressed 
(directly or indirectly) in the sacred texts of other religions and philosophies. 
 
                                                
112  The Appellate Body exercised judicial economy as to whether China’s 2004 Automobile 
Policy created new tariff lines, at the HS 10-digit level, for those kits, or could be deemed as having 
done so. See China Auto Parts Appellate Body Report, ¶ 252. 
113 BOOK OF TOBIT, 4:15a-19 (emphasis supplied). 
114 THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO MATTHEW, 23:34-40 (emphasis supplied). See also CATECHISM 
OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 2055 at 499 (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 
Inc. – Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2nd ed. 1997) (quoting the two Great Commandments from Matthew 
22:37-40, and discussing them in relation to the Ten Commandments). 
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 The advocates for inclusion of China in the WTO urged that by becoming a 
Member, the international rule of law would circumscribe China’s trade behavior. 
The GATT Golden Rule would be an international legal obligation incumbent on 
China to eschew viewing its domestically produced merchandise better than foreign 
competitors. That shift might help China emerge from a Middle Kingdom mentality, 
a Maoist-era semi-isolationist sense, into a responsible stakeholder on the world 
stage.115 
 
 The Auto Parts case was China’s first lesson via adverse litigation as to what the 
Golden Rule of trade means in practice as well as theory. No doubt an elite cadre of 
CCP trade professionals in Beijing knew the logic and details of GATT Article III 
even before China acceded to the WTO on 11 December 2005. No doubt, too, this 
cadre is slowly increasing as China develops, spreading beyond the roughly 63 
million CCP members and Beijing to non-Party members and other major cities. But, 
even in a small country, let alone the most populous nation, appreciation for why 
national treatment matters is not (and probably never will be) universal. Moreover, 
even advanced developed countries make mistakes on national treatment. The loss 
the United States suffered in the Section 337 case is just one example. 
 
 That said, was China smart to fight the Auto Parts case? The facts and the law 
were against it from the outset. Then-United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
Rob Portman said exactly that when the case was launched: 
 
It’s a classic example of discrimination. China maintains 
regulatory policies that impose discriminatory tariffs and 
encourage its automakers to use Chinese parts, at the expense of 
auto parts from the United States and other countries. These 
regulations discourage U.S. exports and create an incentive for 
auto parts makers to relocate to China.116 
 
Hence, it was a case China was nearly destined to lose. The answer to this question is 
“yes” only if China secretly hoped to lose, and then use the Appellate Body Report 
to bludgeon recalcitrant hard-liners to change their ways and begin treating foreign 
auto imports fairly. This response – while privately admitted by trade officials from 
                                                
115 While U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick coined this appellation in a speech he 
delivered in New York on 21 September 2005. His remark was that the U.S. should “step up efforts 
to make China a responsible stakeholder in the international system.” 
 Thus, in the context of Doha Round talks, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao 
declared in December 2008 that “China will continue to play a constructive and active role as a 
responsible country, and work with all sides to promote the negotiations to achieve a comprehensive 
and balanced result on the basis of existing achievements.” Foreign Ministry: China To “Actively” Join 
Doha Round, XINHUA (ENGLISH), 4 December 2008, available at:  http://english.sina.com. 
116 Quoted in Daniel Pruzin & Christopher S. Rugaber, U.S., EU Initiate WTO Dispute Complaints 
Against Chinese Restrictions on Auto Parts, 23 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 530-531 (6 April 2006) 
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time to time representing other countries – is sheer conjecture in the Chinese 
context. The point, then, may be that China ought to review carefully the cases it 
chooses to defend versus settle, if it hopes to avoid running up a string of losses. 
After all, there is no shortage of potential cases China may find itself defending in 
the years to come.117 
 
C. But, More is at Stake 
 
 The China Auto Parts case is a minor part in a far larger drama at play inside 
China. The context in which China’s 2004 Automobile Policy is set, which is 
obviously not a WTO matter, is the grip – dare it be dubbed “iron” or “tenacious” – 
on political power certain elements within the CCP insist on keeping.118 A sagging 
economy amidst global recession, significant wage declines and job losses, and 
consequent industrial unrest would undermine the claim (again, made by some, not 
all, CCP members) that the CCP alone can guide China to higher heights of 
economic prosperity and social peace. Thus, the Financial Times wrote: 
 
… Beijing is feeling defensive: concerned above all else to ensure 
that a sharp slump in growth does not trigger regime-threatening 
unrest. All Chinese policies can almost always be traced back to this 
primal fear.119 
 
The CCP is scared in part because it is well aware of what most average Chinese 
understand intuitively: despite the large absolute size of China’s GDP, in per capita 
purchasing power parity terms, China ranks a pathetic 122nd in the world, behind 
Egypt, El Salvador, and Armenia.120 
 
 Yet, in the long run, what the CCP is not mindful of – through willful blindness 
or intentional suppression – is what will doom its monopoly on power. Thousands 
of Chinese intellectuals, and distinguished leaders like the Dalai Lama, have signed 
Charter ’08 which (inter alia) calls for non-violent change toward modern democratic 
                                                
117 See, e.g., UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S 
WTO COMPLIANCE (December 2008), available at: www.ustr.gov (chronicling many areas of apparent 
non-compliance, as summarized in Table II at pp. 11-14). 
118 Lest this comment be wrongly misread as premised on a disposition hostile toward China or 
the CCP, rather than as being offered in the spirit of friendly, constructive suggestions, it may be 
worth referring to Raj Bhala, Virtues, the Chinese Yuan, and the American Trade Empire, 38 HONG KONG 
LAW JOURNAL part I, 183-253 (May 2008). As the late Professor Edward Said rightly remarked, it is 
the job of the scholar to speak the truth to power. See EDWARD W. SAID, REPRESENTATIONS OF THE 
INTELLECTUAL xvi (1994). 
119 Chinese Leadership Besieged by Caution, FINANCIAL TIMES, 3 February 2009, at 10 (emphasis 
supplied). 
120 See Geoff Dyer, Chinese Data Put Economy in Third Place, FINANCIAL TIMES, 15 January 2009, at 
1. 
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institutions and practices that safeguard basic human dignity and fundamental 
freedoms, including the freedom of conscience and speech.121 To some elements 
within the CCP, the drafters and signatories of the Charter are enemies of the state to 
be ignored, or better yet quashed, rather than Chinese patriots seeking peaceful 
change toward an economic, political, and social climate enjoyed in every other 
major country except China. 
 
 Do the signatories of Charter ’08 speak for the people, including the 20 million 
rural migrant Chinese laborers (15 percent of the total of that cohort) who have lost 
their jobs in the coastal manufacturing centers and returned to the interior?122 The 
short answer is “yes.” Based on its erroneous Marxist premise about human nature – 
that man is fundamentally an economic creature – the official ideology of the CCP 
holds that as long as the CCP can provide the conditions for rapid growth in per 
capita GDP, reduce poverty, and rectify rural-urban imbalances, no rational Chinese 
citizen would want anything more out of life. Throughout history, poor people have 
shown themselves to be more than homo economicus. China need look no further than 
its southern neighbor, and no further back than 60 years. Mahatma Gandhi led a 
movement that, at its root, was about the dignity of every person – no matter how 
destitute or socially outcast. Thus, without doubt, on the points raised in Charter ’08, 
this ideology is on the wrong side of history. That was a point made by President 
Barack H. Obama, in his Inaugural Address, when he stated: 
 
To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on 
mutual interest and mutual respect. To those leaders around the 
globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society's ills on 
the West - know that your people will judge you on what you 
can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling to power through 
corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the 
wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to 
unclench your fist.123 
 
Regrettably, the CCP actually censored parts of the new President’s speech, 
particularly in Chinese-language translations.124 Trade protectionism through 
                                                
121 China’s Charter ’08 is published in a variety of sources, including 56 New York Review of Books 
issue 1 (15 January 2008), available at: www.nybooks.com/articles/22210 (Perry Link, trans.). 
122 See David Pilling, China Should Raise Wages to Stimulate Demand, FINANCIAL TIMES, 5 February 
2009, at 9; Jamil Anderlini & Geoff Dyer, Downturn Has Sent 20m Rural Chinese Home, FINANCIAL 
TIMES, 3 February 2009, at 1. 
123 President Barack H. Obama, Inaugural Address (20 January 2009) available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk. 
124 See Michael Bristow, Obama Speech Censored in China, BBC NEWS, 21 January 2009, available at 
:http://news.bbc.co.uk. See also It Never Stays Long, THE ECONOMIST, 17 January 2009, at 60 
(remarking “the failure of the Beijing Olympics to bring any of the promised (or more accurately, 
hoped-for) changes in China’s policy was probably the biggest disappointment of 2008). 
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measures in key sectors like autos might extend the rule of the CCP – but not 
forever.  
 
 Likewise, no amount of fiscal stimulation will extend in perpetuity the monopoly 
on power of the CCP. In 2008, China’s auto sector posted the lowest rate of growth 
– 6.7 percent – in a decade. Thus, in November 2008, the CCP announced a $586 
billion economic stimulus package, which contained three components to assist 
China’s auto industry:125 
 
1. A cut in the sales tax on small cars (vehicles with engines of 1.6 liters 
or less) from 10 to 5 percent. 
2. Investment of $1.5 billion to upgrade technology. 
3. Expenditures of $750,000 to help farmers shift away from three-
wheeled gas-powered vehicles that pollute heavily. 
 
All three initiatives are laudable, and all three are environmentally friendly, as they 
will help boost fuel efficiency and reduce pollution. To give the benefit of the doubt, 
they are the result of dedicated CCP officials sincerely concerned about the present 
and future livelihoods of their people. But, neither these kinds of initiatives, nor the 
legal record the CCP achieves in WTO adjudication, really matters in proportion to 
the ideals of Charter ’08 – and, in all probability, the CCP knows that. 
 
                                                
125 See Kathleen E. McLaughlin, Chinese Government Announces Auto Industry Aid Under Stimulus, 26 
International Trade Reporter (BNA) 99 (22 January 2009). 
